Product Liability -- 2011



Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.   (U.S. Supreme Court)

Preemption of lap/shoulder seat belt litigation

State laws that conflict with federal law are usually preempted under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause. By the same token, litigation raising product liability claims under state law is preempted if the suits demand action that conflicts with federal regulation. This case involves whether an automobile manufacturer may be sued in state court for installing lap-only seatbelts in certain rear seating positions when the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) specifically rejected such a requirement and gave manufacturers the freedom to choose either a lap-only or a lap/shoulder seatbelt configuration. The agency was delegated the authority to establish a coordinated national safety program, by issuing standards that take into account safety as well as the availability of technology and economic costs. It chose to offer manufacturers two design options, but this lawsuit was over whether a jury may re-examine the same safety, technological feasibility and cost-effectiveness issues that NHTSA balanced under its rulemaking authority.

The NAM and other groups filed an amicus brief on Sept. 28, 2010, arguing that traditional preemption analysis is a settled and vital component of our nationwide system of health, safety and economic regulation, rooted in the Constitution's structure and the understanding of the Founders. We noted that the 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden recognized the validity of preemption when state requirements conflict with federal, and "denounced in the strongest possible terms the essential argument that now recurs almost two centuries later -- the proposition that "the original powers of the States" should be retained "if any possible construction will retain them[.]" We predicted that Congress will never speak distinctly and in adequate detail as to when federal law should and should not displace state law, and it is therefore necessary for the courts to interpret conflict preemption expansively.

On Feb. 23, 2011, the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that the law suit under state law was not preempted by the federal regulation. The decision was based on conflict preemption, that is, whether allowing a state law suit conflicts with and stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of a federal law or regulatory decision. In the Geier case in 2000, the Department of Transportation wanted car companies to try different kinds of restraints, and suits that would have required airbags were preempted because they would have interfered with that objective. In this case, the manufacturer could use either lap belts or lap-and-shoulder belts, but, according to the Supreme Court, this choice is not a “significant objective of the federal regulation” that would be interfered with by a state lawsuit that would punish lapbelt-only configurations. The agency's decision not to require lap-and-shoulder belts was based on its thought that the requirement would not be cost effective, an insufficient justification to preempt state lawsuits.

Thus, the Court's opinion requires that certain preemption decisions be made by analyzing whether federal regulators felt strongly enough to foreclose lawsuits under state law that might force manufacturers to use only one of several options allowed by federal regulations. To establish a foundation for showing preemption in future regulations, it will be important for federal regulators to state on the record their "significant objective" to preempt more restrictive requirements that might arise from state law or litigation.


Related Documents:
NAM brief  (September 28, 2010)