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On November 15, 2023, the NAM filed an amicus brief asking the D.C. Circuit to review an EPA rule concerning the treatment of confidential business information reported to or obtained by EPA under the Toxic Substances Control Act. TSCA requires EPA to maintain an inventory of chemicals manufactured, imported, and processed in the United States for non-exempt commercial purposes. Accordingly, companies must report a new chemical substance or a new use of an existing substance to EPA. Companies that manufacture the substance can claim confidentiality for the submitted information when reporting to EPA.

In this case, EPA's final rule allows third-party waivers of TSCA’s confidentiality protections when a third party, such as a chemical customer or processor, reports a new use of a substance that a manufacturer claimed was confidential. This could allow downstream customers or processors of a chemical who submit information to EPA to waive manufacturers’ confidentiality claims and rights. We argue in our amicus brief that TSCA does not authorize third party waiver of a manufacturer’s confidentiality protections in the fashion contemplated by EPA in its final rule. Protecting confidential business information is important to the competitive strength of the chemical industry to bring innovative solutions and new products to market. Making confidential business information freely available to other companies will disincentivize companies from investing in product development.

On July 27, 2023, the NAM filed an amicus brief in support of the government's and intervenors' position that mining law authorizes mining companies to use more than one mill site--nonmineral land used for mining support activities--per plot of land the companies seek to mine if no individual mill site is larger than five acres. Multiple mill sties are necessary to support mining. We argue that critical minerals obtained from mining play an important role in manufacturing, providing crucial inputs needed to make electric vehicles, batteries, computers and a wide range of other products. Reduced production of critical minerals would undermine U.S. national security interests by making the core military apparatus dependent on foreign sources of critical minerals. Reduced production of critical minerals would also produce worse environmental and safety outcomes by making less critical minerals available for the U.S. to develop a reliable renewable energy network and allowing nations that have weaker environmental and labor standards to dominate the critical mineral market.

On June 9, 2023, the NAM filed an amicus brief urging the D.C. Circuit to reverse the dismissal of an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) challenge to a final rule issued by the Librarian of the Library of Congress for lack of jurisdiction. The final rule exempts from copyright liability third-party service companies that circumvent technological protective measures for the purpose of diagnosing and repairing software-enabled medical devices, including MRI, CAT scan and X-ray machines. The trial court found that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the APA challenge because the Library of Congress is exempt from the APA.

We argue in our brief that allowing third-party repair of manufacturers’ products poses a danger to consumers and exposes companies’ intellectual property to theft by competitors. The APA authorizes judicial review of the Librarian's actions when the Librarian exercises rulemaking authority.

The NAM joined with partner organizations to bring a prophylactic challenge to a final rule regulating PIP (3:1)—a persistent, bio-accumulative chemical that is ubiquitous in manufacturing operations and supply chains—under the Toxic Substances Control Act. The rule called for the prohibition of PIP (3:1) on an aggressive timeline that would have severely impacted supply chains for a wide variety of electronics, from cell phones, to robotics used to manufacture semiconductors, to equipment used to move COVID-19 vaccines and keep them at the appropriate temperature. After the NAM coalition files it petition in the D.C. Circuit raising these compliance issues, the EPA agreed to seek additional public input on the rule for a period of 60 days, with a special focus on alternative exposure reduction measures for certain products. The agency also issued a issued a rare “No Action Assurance” to notify regulated industry that it would not enforce the rule for 180 days pending next steps in the rulemaking process to provide longer-term relief. The case is currently in abeyance pending the new rulemaking.

In 2017, the MCLA sued the EPA to challenge the agency’s rule governing risk management plans for chemical facilities and oil refineries. The rule imposed costly and burdensome requirements on facilities that handle hazardous substances without improving worker or community safety. The court stayed the litigation after the EPA delayed enforcement of the rule and proposed a substantive replacement. The EPA then issued a final rule in 2019. The litigation remains stayed pending further orders from the court.

On March 6, 2024, the NAM joined a coalition of other major business trade associations to file suit in the D.C. Circuit to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s misguided final rule lowering the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for fine particulate matter (PM2.5) to 9 micrograms per cubic meter. The Clear Air Act requires manufacturers to obtain preconstruction permits for new and modified emissions sources obtainable only after showing that emissions from the proposed new source will not cause or contribute to a PM 2.5 NAAQS violation. The Clean Air Act also requires the EPA to review the NAAQS every five years to determine whether the PM2.5 standard should be retained or revised. In December 2020, following a complete review of the PM NAAQS, the EPA decided to retain the PM2.5 standard of 12 micrograms per cubic meter. But in June 2021, the agency announced it would reconsider that decision. The EPA ultimately issued the revised standard in an out-of-cycle reconsideration becoming the first administration to redo a promulgated NAAQS. The standard stands to impede economic development in much of the country due to many manufacturers’ inability to establish that a proposed new construction or modified emission source will not cause or contribute to a PM 2.5 NAAQS violation. The NAM therefore sued to protect manufacturers’ ability to obtain permits, expand facilities and pursue long-term investment plans, and defend our country’s competitive advantage.

The NAM sued the EPA in 2015 to challenge the EPA’s declaration that 36 states’ state implementation plans (SIPs) under the Clean Air Act are invalid because they allow air emissions in excess of permit limits during startup, shutdown or equipment malfunctions. That flexibility is important to manufacturers that might temporarily exceed permit limits for reasons beyond their control. The litigation has been held in abeyance since April 2017 while the EPA considers whether to revise or rescind the rule.

On June 25, 2018, the NAM moved to intervene in a case involving permitting requirements for manufacturers under the Clean Air Act. Environmental groups sued to challenge a guidance document from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that streamlines Clean Air Act permits under the New Source Review program for facilities that expand or modify their operations. If the plaintiffs' claims are successful, facility modifications could be significantly delayed and rendered more expensive. The NAM's motion asks the court to allow the NAM to become a co-defendant in the case with EPA to bring the voice of manufacturers in defense of the EPA's sensible policy.

On July 13, 2018, the court held the case in abeyance pending the completion of an EPA rulemaking to implement the terms of the guidance document. The litigation is expected to reactivate when the final rule issues.

The NAM sought review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 2015 Clean Power Plan rule governing New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for greenhouse gases from electric utilities. The rule is an attempt to address emissions from new, modified and reconstructed electric generating units. This case is important for manufacturers because EPA should not rely on policy preferences rather than the rule of law.

The NAM sued the EPA with a broad industry coalition to challenge the NSPS rule. We seek to invalidate the rule to pave the way for a sensible alternative. Our briefs argue that the rule is unlawful because EPA’s conclusions are arbitrary and capricious, not supported by substantial evidence, and fail to make the requisite endangerment findings. In 2017, the D.C. Circuit held the rule in abeyance while the current administration considers whether to revise or rescind the rule.

On 2/16/17, the NAM and other associations moved to intervene in a case brought by North Dakota challenging the EPA's latest action on its Clean Power Plan (CPP). The agency rejected a petition to reconsider the rule, and that decision is now being challenged in court. The case is likely to be affected by the court's soon-to-be-issued ruling in our main challenge to the CPP rule, since the procedural and substantive defects in the petition for reconsideration overlap significantly with the issues raised in the case already before the court. A motion to hold the case in abeyance pending EPA reconsideration was granted, and the case remains in abeyance.

In June, 2014, the Sierra Club challenged 9 EPA Clean Air Act rules in court, alleging that provisions in each rule are no longer valid as a result of a decision in April by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The provisions at issue allows companies an affirmative defense to civil penalties for exceeding emissions limits that are caused by malfunctions. A company must prove that the malfunction was sudden, infrequent, not reasonably preventable and not caused by poor maintenance or careless operation, and that it took steps to correct the malfunction and minimize resulting emissions.

In April, the court decided in Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA to vacate portions of a Portland cement industry rule pertaining to the affirmative defense, finding that the EPA lacked the authority to create a defense applicable in federal court. This Sierra Club suit attempts to remove the defense from 9 other rules in which it arises, involving various industries and kinds of equipment. Challenges to regulations must be brought within 60 days of their promulgation unless the petition "is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day . . . ." The suit claims that the NRDC case decision constitutes grounds arising after the rules were promulgated.

In July, the NAM and 13 other business associations filed a motion to intervene in the suit. Manufacturers will be negatively impacted if the suit is successful, since it could make them liable for permit violations arising from unavoidable equipment malfunctions. That liability can arise both from EPA citations and from citizen suits around the country.

The rules at issue govern chemical manufacturing, pulp and paper mills, steel pickling, marine tank vessel loading operations, industrial steam-generating units, nitric acid plants and others.

On July 25, the court ordered the case held in abeyance while the EPA decided on a pending administrative petition from the Sierra Club to revise the rules. The EPA granted the petition, and on December 17, 2014, the court held this case in abeyance until the EPA completes the rules revision process. As of July 30, 2019, the EPA has not yet completed its administrative process.

On July 31, 2023, the NAM filed an amicus brief urging the D.C. Circuit to vacate the EPA’s 2020 rule that sets emission standards for ethylene oxide. Ethylene oxide is frequently used to sterilize critical medical products in the United States. In a 2016 Integrated Risk Information System (“IRIS”) assessment, the EPA developed a value that estimates the health risk of inhalation exposure to ethylene oxide. The EPA used this value as a basis for setting ethylene oxide emissions standards in 2020 that limited the emissions from over 200 chemical manufacturing facilities. In 2022, the EPA issued a decision on reconsideration of its 2020 rule, reaffirming the rule and its reliance on the 2016 IRIS value.

We argued in our brief that the EPA violated the Administrative Procedure Act by using its 2016 IRIS value without following its own guidance for setting standards and providing an adequate explanation for failing to do so. Specifically, the EPA failed to follow the best available science, to take into consideration disagreement within the scientific community as to the proper approach to calculating cancer risks and to subject its 2016 IRIS value to peer review. This case is important to all chemical manufacturers who oppose using IRIS values to assess safe emission levels because such values are usually set at detect levels rather than levels that would contribute to harm. It will also have an impact on the medical community because some medical devices and instruments can only be sterilized with ethylene oxide, making the availability of the chemical necessary for safe and high-quality medical devices necessary for use in medical procedures.

On February 7, 2023, the NAM filed an amicus brief urging the D.C. Circuit to set aside the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission’s mandatory rule overriding voluntary industry safety standards for custom widow covering cords that, if implemented, would have a devastating impact on the custom window covering industry. We argue that CPSC issued the mandatory rule in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act because of its failure to clear the high bar required for CSPC to override voluntary standards--here, the agency failed to show that rule was necessary and justifiable and conducted a flawed cost-benefit analysis which failed to account for the impact on small businesses. The CPSC also failed to provide a proper notice and comment period, finalizing a rule that deviated substantially from the initial proposal. In recent years, CPSC has been increasingly aggressive in overriding voluntary standards, pushing its authority beyond the parameters Congress set for it when it enacted the Consumer Protection Safety Act. This case therefore has significant ramifications for the regulatory landscape surrounding consumer products—specifically, whether CPSC will have to defer to voluntary standards or be allowed to overstep its statutory bounds to issue mandatory regulations. Happily, on September 12, 2023, the D.C, Circuit vacated CPSC's final rule.

The NAM filed a response brief in the D.C. Circuit in defense of a program that provides hundreds of thousands of skilled workers for manufacturers and other American businesses. To address a shortfall of certain skilled workers in the American economy, the federal government in 1992 established the "optional practical training" (OPT) program. That program and a subsequent extension for STEM students (STEM OPT) allows foreign-born students to continue their educational training by working in the United States for up to three years after completing college or a graduate degree. Without the OPT program and STEM OPT, manufacturers would be unable to fill critical positions requiring specialized training in engineering, math, technology and the sciences. An anti-immigration activist group sought to invalidate the entire OPT program by suing the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. To help ensure the continued availability of hundreds of thousands of highly skilled workers for manufacturers, the NAM intervened in the case as a defendant. Becoming a defendant allowed the NAM to present the best legal arguments possible in support of the OPT program and STEM OPT. The court granted NAM's motion for intervention in 2019, and on November 30, 2020, the court granted NAM’s request for summary judgment.

The activist group then appealed the ruling to the D.C. Circuit. Happily, in a 2-1 decision issued on October 4, 2022, the D.C. Circuit upheld the validity of the STEM OPT program as a lawful exercise of executive branch authority.

The NAM filed an amicus brief to support EPA’s defense of a trading program for ozone NAAQS pollutants. The Clean Air Act (CAA) requires EPA to establish national ambient air quality standards for six pollutants, including ozone. A 2018 EPA rule allowed companies to trade ozone pollutants with other emitters to meet federal emissions requirements. An environmental group sued to challenge the rule, arguing that the trading program is not allowed by the CAA. NAM members that seek to expand or build a new facility in many areas of the country can benefit greatly from this trading program. Pollutant trading programs like this provide a market-based solution that companies can use to grow their operations while reducing harmful air emissions in the aggregate. The NAM’s amicus brief explains the important and effective role of emissions trading and why such a program complies with the CAA. Unfortunately, on January 29, 2021, the court held that as a matter of statutory construction, the CAA prohibits the program.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit challenging the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) decision to place an industrial site on the National Priorities List (NPL) under the Superfund program. The NPL is a list of contaminated sites that EPA has determined have the highest priority for investigation and possible cleanup. The site at issue in this case was placed on the list based solely on subsurface intrusion, also known as “vapor intrusion,” without considering the site’s sub-slab depressurization system used to mitigate vapor intrusion. If upheld, the EPA’s decision to exclude the mitigation system would undermine the efforts of manufacturers who have proactively installed and operated these systems. The NAM’s brief argued that the EPA arbitrarily and unlawfully failed to take into account the active mitigation system and used a residential rather than industrial exposure benchmark. Unfortunately, on July 28, 2020, the court declined to review EPA's decision.

The NAM intervened on behalf of the EPA to defend the EPA’s decision not to impose new Clean Air Act emissions limitations on hundreds of manufacturing facilities throughout the Midwest. In 2018, New York petitioned the EPA to force nine nearby states to impose stringent new air emissions restrictions on manufacturers and other facilities within their borders. The NAM filed coalition comments with the EPA that explained why the EPA should reject the petition, which it did in October of 2019. New York then sued the EPA to overturn the rejection. The NAM -- together with other impacted trade associations and individual companies -- intervened in the case to defend the EPA’s decision and to represent the interests of manufacturers in the litigation, filing an initial proof brief in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals on March 5, 2020. Unfortunately, on July 14, 2020, the court vacated EPA's decision and remanded the petition back to EPA for further proceedings.

The NAM filed an amicus brief on behalf of Troy Corporation to argue that the EPA’s listing of sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act should accurately reflect the site’s potential environmental risks and not rely on artificial and inaccurate rules of thumb. The EPA added a creek that runs through and adjacent to Troy Corporation’s manufacturing facility in Newark, NJ to CERCLA’s National Priority List. The listing was based in significant part on the EPA’s assessment that the creek had the potential to contaminate a fishing pier located 13 miles away. That assessment was based solely on regulatory assumptions that Troy rebutted in regulatory comments. In response to those comments, EPA responded that it is entitled to rely on the bright line presumptions in the regulation and need not demonstrate any actual risk of contamination. If such a position is upheld, many manufacturing sites could be listed as “priority” CERCLA sites when they have no actual potential to cause such environmental harm. The NAM’s amicus brief argues that this approach to listing sites violates CERCLA and could adversely impact many manufacturers. Unfortunately, on November 13, 2020, the court denied Troy's petition for review.

The NAM filed an amicus brief urging the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to reverse the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia's refusal to delay the deadline for filing the Revised EEO-1 Report “Component 2” pay data. The district court also should not have crafted its own remedy that ignored the significant deficiencies in the record. Component 2 creates an administrative burden for employers who will now be forced to bear the costs of complying with the requirements. The NAM’s brief argued that the EEOC had previously recognized that changes to EEO-1 require significant time and expense, the record showed questionable public benefits and the data should not be required until EEOC can preserve confidentiality.

The NAM filed an amicus brief supporting AT&T in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The government appealed the district court’s determination that AT&T’s merger with Time Warner is unlikely to “substantially lessen competition.” Preserving flexibility to pursue efficient mergers and promoting predictable and transparent antitrust enforcement is important to all of industry. The NAM’s brief argued that mergers such as this increase efficiency and benefit consumers, and clear merger standards are important to provide the business community with confidence to invest in transactions that have the potential to lower prices and benefit everyone. The D.C. Circuit rejected the government's challenge.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit supporting the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) repeal of the 2015 net neutrality rule. In August, a group of plaintiffs sued alleging the FCC unlawfully overturned the 2015 rule by mischaracterizing how the internet access works. Manufacturers are the beneficiaries of a global broadband infrastructure, which has transformed the way they operate, providing numerous opportunities to create and market innovative products and services. The NAM’s brief explains that regulating broadband providers as common carriers is unwise, and the FCC’s change promotes investment that is critical to developing the next generation of technologies. In a win for manufacturers, on October 1, 2019, the court upheld the repeal.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in support of the Mountain Valley Pipeline, a major new natural gas transmission pipeline to bring natural gas from the Marcellus shale region to manufacturers, electricity generators, and other consumers in the eastern United States. The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved the pipeline under Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act. Environmental groups sued to challenge that authorization, arguing that FERC's environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) should have quantified the greenhouse gas emissions impacts of all possible downstream uses of the natural gas. If courts interpret NEPA as imposing that requirement, the approval process for major energy infrastructure projects will only become more complex, delayed, and uncertain as FERC undertakes a speculative GHG analysis that environmental groups would inevitably challenge in court to delay project commencement. The NAM's amicus brief argued that NEPA does not compel a GHG analysis for every new energy infrastructure project, and that FERC properly exercised its discretion in determining that GHG emissions are not indirect effects of its approval of the Mountain Valley Pipeline. On February 19, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld FERC's approval, concluding that FERC's consideration of the potential emissions impacts was reasonable under NEPA.

The NAM filed an amicus brief to defend the EPA’s withdrawal of a prior EPA policy known as "once in, always in" that imposed unreasonable and unlawful regulatory burdens on manufacturers under the Clean Air Act. In January of 2018, the EPA issued a guidance memorandum withdrawing the prior policy for the classification of major sources of hazardous air pollutants under section 112 of the Clean Air Act. With the new guidance, sources of hazardous air pollutants previously classified as “major sources” may be reclassified as “area” sources when the facility limits its potential to emit below major source thresholds. The new policy promotes regulatory clarity and reduces burdens for manufacturers while continuing to ensure stringent and effective controls on hazardous air pollutants. Environmental groups sued to challenge the policy change. The NAM filed an amicus brief in support of the EPA. Our brief explains how the policy change will continue to preserve air quality while removing unlawful and excessive regulatory burdens on manufacturers. In a win for manufacturers, on August 20, 2019, the court dismissed the challenge, finding the guidance was not final agency action subject to judicial review.

The NAM intervened in a lawsuit by environmental groups that seeks to constrain manufacturers' ability to recycle hazardous waste. The plaintiffs challenged a 2018 rule by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that removed significant burdens on manufacturers to recycle hazardous waste under the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Those burdens had been removed in the 2018 rule as a result of successful NAM litigation in 2017 that challenged an earlier EPA regulation that unreasonably burdened manufacturers. Hazardous waste recycling is important to many segments of the manufacturing industry because it allows companies to reuse or repurpose chemicals, minerals, or other products that otherwise would require disposal (typically at significant expense). By intervening on behalf of EPA, the NAM sought to preserve the 2018 rule and to bring the voice of manufacturers to the litigation. On July 2, 2019, the D.C. Circuit, in a unanimous ruling, rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge. This ruling preserves a safe and cost-effective means for companies to recycle hazardous waste.

The MCLA intervened in a lawsuit by environmental groups that seeks to overturn an EPA rule implementing the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). The rule, “TSCA Inventory Notification (Active-Inactive) Requirements,” governs the process whereby the EPA must update the list of chemicals used in commerce in the United States. The EPA’s final rule allowed companies to keep certain information about the chemical free from public disclosure on confidentiality grounds. An environmental group sued to challenge the rule, arguing that the EPA failed to comply with various procedural requirements in promulgating the rule and that the rule unlawfully shields information from public disclosure. The confidentiality of chemical information is critically important to chemical manufacturers. To help defend the rule, the MCLA intervened in the case. On June 26, 2019, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected all but one of the plaintiffs’ claims. It broadly upheld the confidentiality aspects of the rule of greatest concern to chemical manufacturers. Given the EPA’s relatively minor procedural misstep on only one aspect of the rule, the court allowed the rule to continue in force while the EPA addresses the procedural error.

In 2015 the NAM sued the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to challenge its final rule lowering the ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) from 75 to 70 parts per billion. The rule could be one of the most expensive in history and burden manufacturers by limiting their air emissions and ability to grow and expand operations. The NAM seeks to invalidate the standard and secure an instruction from the court to raise the standard. The court stayed litigation in April 2017 to allow the new presidential administration to determine whether to revise the standard. On August 1, 2018, EPA announced that it would not revise the standard but instead expedite the consideration and issuance of the 2020 NAAQS standard. In August of 2019, the D.C. Circuit upheld the 2015 ozone NAAQS standard of 70 ppb against claims by environmental groups that the standard is too lax, but also rejected arguments by the NAM and other industry groups and states that the standard is too strict and fails to properly account for background sources of ozone. This ruling avoids the serious economic consequences that would have come with the court mandating a lower standard.

The NAM intervened in a legal challenge by environmental groups to a policy by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency that clarifies manufacturers' permitting obligations under the Clean Air Act. The lawsuit seeks to invalidate an EPA interpretive memorandum that identifies factors to guide a facility’s determination of whether separate physical or operational changes to the facility constitute a single project” under the EPA’s New Source Review (NSR) permitting program. Determining the extent of a project under NSR is important for many manufacturers because combining several pollution sources at a facility can trigger NSR permitting requirements that mandate expensive air pollution control technologies. The NAM intervened as a defendant on behalf of the EPA to help defend the interpretation and preserve regulatory clarity for manufacturers. On June 25, 2019, the environmental plaintiffs moved to dismiss their case. Although their dismissal motion did not state the reasons, we infer that our intervention arguments might have caused them to realize the weakness of their case.

The NAM filed an amicus brief to argue that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), when reviewing a pipeline company’s permit application for a new pipeline infrastructure project, does not have a categorical obligation under federal law to forecast the speculative greenhouse gas impacts of possible uses of the natural gas by unknown and unknowable customers of the natural gas. The case arises from FERC’s approval of upgrades to an existing natural gas pipeline in New York state. In reviewing the environmental impacts of those upgrades under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), FERC declined to undertake a speculative analysis of the greenhouse gas impacts of the possible uses of the natural gas by the ultimate customers of the gas. An environmental group sued FERC to challenge that determination. In FERC’s defense, the NAM filed an amicus brief to support FERC’s approach of determining on a case-by-case basis whether a greenhouse gas analysis is appropriate for a particular energy infrastructure project. This approach is important to manufacturers because it avoids prolonged and speculative environmental reviews that opposition groups can use as a basis to challenge and delay new energy infrastructure development. On May 9, 2019, the court found the plaintiffs lacked standing and therefore dismissed the case.

In 2015, the NAM challenged the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, a rule that went beyond the EPA’s legal authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions under the Clean Air Act. Before the rule became effective, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the rule pending the resolution of the litigation. Then, in 2017, the D.C. Circuit held the litigation itself in abeyance to allow the incoming administration to decide whether to rescind or revise the rule. The EPA proposed a replacement rule—the Affordable Clean Energy Rule—in August 2018. A final rule issued in June 2019. With the Clean Power Plan rule replaced by the Affordable Clean Energy Rule, the parties moved to dismiss the case. On September 17, 2019, the court dismissed the case as moot.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit supporting employers in their efforts to retain highly skilled workers. Spouses of H-1B skilled workers who have been approved for permanent residence can apply for and receive H-4 visas allowing them to work in the United States. If this rule were invalidated, manufacturers would lose access to leading talent, harming their ability to remain competitive in the world economy. A federal district court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the case. On appeal to the D.C. Circuit, the NAM's amicus brief highligted the positive effects of the H-4 program. On November 8, 2019, the D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court's holding on standing and remanded the case to the lower court to allow the case to proceed on the merits.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in support of UPS in the first as-applied challenge of the ambush election rule. In 2014, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued the election rule, which elevated speed above due process and transparency. Shortly thereafter, because the Election Rule failed to balance other important policy objectives, the NAM brought a facial challenge to the rule in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, which rejected the challenge based on its belief that the rule would be applied in a fair manner. A fair, transparent and thorough election process is important for manufacturing employees to be able to have an informed choice whether they want to be represented by a union. The NAM’s brief argues that this case serves as a prime example of how the rule has been applied to deny employers due process, such as by failing to resolve a voter eligibility issue before the election and denying an appropriate hearing. The D.C. Circuit held that there was no defect in the Board’s decision to certify the Union and consequently denied UPS’s petition for review.

The NAM intervened in a case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit involving a 2015 EPA Rule regarding environmental restrictions on industrial boilers. The rule requires maximum achievable control technology (MACT) for equipment to reduce emissions of hazardous air pollutants, taking into consideration the cost of achieving such reductions. There are two primary issues in the case: (1) whether the EPA properly established a minimum standard level of 130 parts per million (ppm) of carbon monoxide for certain boiler emissions and; (2) whether the EPA reasonably established work practice standards for periods of startup and shutdown where it is impracticable to determine compliance with numerical standards during those periods. Manufacturers would bear a large burden and financial hardship if the Sierra Club prevailed in its challenge to this rule. Our brief argued that EPA properly justified setting the limit at 130 ppm for carbon monoxide as a proxy for hazardous air pollutants The court held that the 130 ppm limit is reasonable and also held that the rule’s flexibility on emissions during startup and shutdown of the boilers is reasonable and consistent with the Clean Air Act. The plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing with the court, which the NAM opposed, and the court denied the rehearing request.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in the D.C. Circuit supporting Browning-Ferris in its appeal from an adverse decision by the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) in a dispute regarding the legal standard that should apply when determining whether two or more companies are “joint employers” under federal labor law. The Board abandoned its longstanding legal standard for joint employer determinations, replacing it with a new standard that evaluated whether an entity exercised indirect control over the means or manner of the employees’ work and terms of employment, or whether the entity had the potential to exercise such control. If upheld, the new standard would unreasonably expand the companies deemed to be an individual’s employer and impose employment obligations and liabilities on those employers. The NAM’s brief argued that the longstanding “direct control” standard should remain the standard for determining joint employment and that the Board’s loosened standard subjected companies to unmerited liability, without providing the same benefits as the old rule. The D.C. Circuit upheld the Board’s consideration of “reserved right to control” and “indirect control” in the joint-employer inquiry but remanded the case to the NLRB for it to adequately define what constitutes control.

The NAM challenged two final regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that define hazardous solid waste and would impose stringent regulatory obligations governing waste generation, treatment, storage, disposal and permitting. The EPA asserted jurisdiction to regulate solid and hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which defined “hazardous waste” as “solid waste” that may pose a danger to human health or the environment. The definition is important to manufacturers that reuse materials in the manufacturing process, as well as for disposal and recycling procedures. The NAM sued the EPA to resolve concerns related to new affirmative duties and conditions on in-process materials that are not discarded. The NAM argued that EPA’s attempt to regulate materials that are not yet waste exceeds the agency’s authority. In a win for manufacturers, the court held that that some of the requirements imposed on companies using third-party recyclers exceeded the EPA's statutory authority and improperly presumed that recycled materials were discarded simply because the recyclers did not meet various paperwork requirements.

The NAM intervened in a suit brought by the Sierra Club and Natural Resources Defense Council against the EPA for its regulation on sulfur dioxide (SO2). The regulation, published August 5, 2013, designated 29 areas as “nonattainment” for SO2 based on recorded air quality monitoring data, and the EPA announced its intention to address the rest of the country in separate regulations in the future. The modeling predictions urged by the Sierra Club would allow areas to be designated as nonattainment when in fact they are not. That would increase the number of such areas, and manufacturers would have to spend billions of dollars to achieve far greater emission reductions than would be required if designations were based on actual air quality monitoring data. The NAM intervened to help secure a more positive regulation for manufacturers. A district court approved a consent decree requiring the EPA to include any areas with stationary sources that emitted more than 16,000 tons of SO2 in 2012 and extending the timeline for the EPA to promulgate a new rule. The deadline is now December 31, 2020, which will allow for real-life modeling data to be used instead of the Sierra Club's recommendation of computer modeling. This is a favorable outcome for manufacturers. The consent decree was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s approval.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in support of an employer’s right to manage internal company investigations of employee misconduct. This case stemmed from a previous National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision where Banner Health Systems instructed employees to maintain confidentiality during ongoing investigations of employee misconduct. This issue is important to manufacturers because their business operations would be disrupted by employees discussing the details of a sensitive internal company investigation. The NAM’s brief argued that the NLRB’s ruling would burden employers by requiring them to justify the need for investigatory confidentiality at a point where such justification would be almost impossible. Although the decision is narrowly tailored, the outcome is a win for manufacturers as the court did not opine on the NLRB’s case-by-case approach to justify employer confidentiality.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in support of FedEx’s position that delivery service contractors working for FedEx were independent contractors, not employees of FedEx. The facts of this case were “materially indistinguishable” from a prior case where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit determined that a group of delivery service contractors were not FedEx employees, but were independent contractors under the National Labor Relations Act. This case is important as worker classification may have broad ramifications affecting the use of independent contractors and partnerships between manufacturers and commercial vehicle drivers are a key asset. The NAM’s brief explained that worker classification issues directly impact all segments of the economy and more directly, the trucking industry. In a win for manufacturers, the court ruled against the plaintiffs.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit supporting Volkswagen in a collective bargaining dispute with the United Auto Workers (UAW). The UAW brought the complaint after Volkswagen opposed the creation of a micro-bargaining unit exclusively for maintenance employees; UAW argued that because maintenance employees “share a unique function” they are readily identifiable and therefore should be recognized as a bargaining unit. This litigation is important to manufacturers because micro-bargaining units disrupt highly integrated manufacturing operations. The NAM’s brief argued that the Specialty Healthcare case, which reversed 70 years of precedent and instated a new standard for determining a collective bargain unit, should not apply because that case is inconsistent with the statue and the legislative history. After the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a revised ruling in another case, the D.C. Circuit remanded this case back to the NLRB for reconsideration.

The NAM intervened in a challenge a new Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) crystalline silica rule, which imposed crushing regulatory burdens on manufacturers. The new rule cut the current permissible crystalline silica exposure limit in half and required employers to implement costly engineering controls. The NAM has members in each of the 24 manufacturing industry subsectors that are affected by the rule. The NAM intervened against OSHA but sought to work with OSHA to make this a feasible, effective rule with a clear justification based on reliable, current data. The NAM argued that the rule relies on out-of-date economic data and drastically underestimated the costs that will be inflicted on manufacturers and the entire economy. Unfortunately, the court upheld OSHA’s new silica regulation, leaving the industry to bear the draconian burden of compliance.

The NAM filed an amicus brief supporting the telecommunications industry and opposing the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) reclassification of broadband service providers as telecommunications services subject to common carrier regulations. This litigation was a challenge to the FCC’s net neutrality rule, which reclassified and regulated broadband service providers as common carriers. That rule discouraged investment, stifled innovation and invited uncertainty for companies trying to predict how they may do business. The NAM’s brief argued that 1) the FCC’s reclassification must be set aside because it was contrary to the Communications Act of 1934; 2) the reclassification was promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act; and 3) broadband providers “rates” and “practices” would be subject to the broad and ambiguous standards, which would decrease the variety and quality of internet services. Unfortunately, the court rejected the challenges.

The NAM challenged an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) final rule on hazardous air pollutants, which imposes burdensome regulatory requirements on boilers, incinerators and process heaters. The rule requires “generally available control technologies” (GACT) or management practices to reduce emissions of hazardous air pollutants, taking into consideration the cost of achieving such reductions. This rule imposes costly compliance requirements on manufacturers subject to the rule. The NAM argued that 1) the EPA did not have sufficient data to property calculate an emissions standard based on the best performing 12% of combustions units as statutorily required but instead used the Upper Prediction Limit (UPL) methodology to estimate the emissions limits based on fewer data points; and 2) by requesting a voluntary remand, the EPA effectively conceded that the methodology used to calculate the UPL standards is flawed. While the court rejected the NAM’s arguments in 2016, it ordered the agency to provide further justification for some of its conclusions.

The NAM challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) new regulations on commercial and industrial solid waste incineration (CISWI) units that impose stricter emissions limits on industrial, commercial and institutional boilers. The new rule amended a rule previously issued in 2011 by placing further restrictions on materials used as fuels or ingredients in combustion units. The regulations will impose additional costs on manufacturers that will now require additional resources to remain compliant with the regulations. The NAM argued that 1) the EPA failed to account for variability in waste materials when classifying best-performing units; 2) the EPA should consider emissions occurring during startups, shutdowns and malfunctions when determining whether emissions limits are achievable; and 3) the EPA does not have legal authority to impose recordkeeping requirements through the CISWI rule on operators who combust non-hazardous secondary materials that are not waste. Although the court rejected the NAM’s arguments, it ordered the agency to provide further justification for some of its conclusions.

The NAM challenged an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) effort to interpret its authority with the “Tailoring Rule,” which attempts to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources. After earlier interpretations of the rule caused absurd consequences, the EPA raised thresholds to impact only the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. The rule will impose significant administrative and cost burdens on manufacturers. The NAM argued that 1) the EPA could have adopted a more reasonable interpretation of its power so as to avoid the absurdities the rule attempts to mitigate; 2) although the EPA tried to avoid these absurd results by modifying the express statutory thresholds defining who is regulated, the action is outside of the EPA’s legal authority; and 3) as the rule is at odds with Congress’s intent when it enacted the Clean Air Act, the court must avoid agency interpretations that undermine the purpose of the law. The parties voluntarily dismissed this case in February 2016.

The NAM challenged an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) final rule on hazardous air pollutants, which would impose burdensome regulatory requirements on boilers, incinerators and process heaters. Because the rule requires the “maximum degree of reduction” in emissions of hazardous air pollutants achievable, taking into consideration the cost of achieving such reductions, the rule also requires “maximum achievable control technology” (MACT) for such equipment. This rule is burdensome, will impose additional costs and require additional resources for industrial sectors subject to the rule. The NAM argued that 1) the startup work practices were incorporated into the new rules without giving key stakeholders adequate opportunity to comment; 2) important safety considerations for the regulated community were overlooked in the definitions; 3) the rule failed to take account of the importance of encouraging efficient and cost effective use of resources; 4) the fuel requirements in the rule do not incorporate national goals of safeguarding fuel diversity; and 5) the EPA does not have legal authority to impose the energy assessment requirement. This case was consolidated with U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA, a similar challenge to EPA’s boiler MACT regulations, and in 2016, that court rejected all industry arguments, finding that the EPA's approach was reasonable.

The NAM challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 2013 final rule on commercial and industrial solid waste incineration (CISWI) units, which imposes stricter emissions limits on industrial, commercial and institutional boilers. The rule follows a 2011 rule that also imposed restrictions on materials used as fuels or ingredients in combustion units. The rules will impose additional costs and require sectors impacted by the rule to provide additional resources to remain compliant. The court consolidated this case into , a challenge to the 2011 rule on CISWI units, where the NAM argued that 1) the EPA failed to account for variability in waste materials when classifying best-performing units; 2) the EPA should consider emissions occurring during startups, shutdowns and malfunctions when determining whether emissions limits are achievable; and 3) the EPA could not impose recordkeeping requirements through the CISWI rule on operators that combust non-hazardous secondary materials that are not waste. Although the court rejected the NAM’s arguments, it ordered the agency to provide further justification for some of its conclusions.

The NAM challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA), Boiler Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standard used to regulate emissions of hazardous air pollutants generated by boilers. The challenge came after EPA issued the final MCAT rule; however, the EPA did not have enough data to properly calculate an emissions standard based on the statutory requirement. This decision will impose enormous costs on key industrial sectors. The NAM argued that the EPA exceeded its authority in imposing an energy assessment requirement on portions of the facility that are not part of the defined source category (boilers and process heaters); 2) the emissions limitations are unlawful because they have not been achieved in practice; 3) the standards are not achievable because they were set without accounting for malfunctions; 4) EPA improperly established a numeric emission limitation for organic pollutants rather than a work practice as it has done in a comparable rule; and 5) EPA failed to justify its reversal of previously established health-based limits for hydrogen chloride. In 2016, the court rejected all industry arguments, finding that the EPA's approach was reasonable.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in a labor litigation lawsuit to oppose the Department of Labor’s (DOL) application of the Davis-Bacon Act, which requires “prevailing wages” for construction workers on public buildings or public works projects funded by the federal or D.C. government, to a private construction project. This is an appeal after DOL ruled that the City Center DC project was subject to the 1931 Davis-Bacon Act. If left unchecked, the DOL’s attempt to apply the Davis-Bacon Act to the private construction industry would have had a significant and potentially negative impact on private industry, the government and the economy. The NAM’s brief argued that DOL’s application of the Davis-Bacon Act to a private construction project was contrary to the language of the Act and that it was an unprecedented attempt to expand the scope of the Davis-Bacon Act into the private construction industry. The court applied common sense reasoning to reject DOL’s expansion of federal law.

The NAM filed an amicus brief supporting employers’ rights to protect sensitive communications between employees and an employer’s counsel. This case involves an in-house investigation of tips alleging potential False Claims Act violations where, although the company provided 100,000 pages of documents during the discovery phase, the trial judge ordered that 89 documents identified as privileged be disclosed. If upheld, this precedent will penalize companies for adopting internal compliance programs and force companies to either risk a waiver of attorney-client privilege or to forego legal advice. The NAM’s brief argued that 1) a communication with counsel should be protected provided that the predominant or primary purpose of the communication is for securing legal advice; and 2) if these communications were to lose their privilege solely because they were part of a compliance investigation, “required by regulatory law’” many regulatory programs would be frustrated. In 2014, the appellate court overruled the trial court’s decision and ruled that the communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The trial court again ruled against the privilege assertions, and the NAM filed a second amicus brief in 2015 supporting mandamus to the appellate court. In a win for manufacturers, the appellate court reversed the district court for a second time.

Various states sued EPA over its tailoring rule, by which the agency rolled out enforcement of greenhouse gas regulations to the largest facilities first, followed by smaller ones later. States must comply with EPA's new regulations. The NAM and 14 other business associations in our coalition filed a motion to intervene in litigation filed by representatives of 8 states challenging EPA's authority. Their lawsuit sought judicial review of EPA's plan to retroactively limit its previous approval of pollution thresholds in State Implementation Plans (SIPs). The states are likely to argue that EPA violated the Clean Air Act by its reinterpretation of existing regulations, which would result in significant additional costs to manufacturers regulated under state programs.

The NAM's intervention in this case is designed to assist the court in understanding the interaction between EPA's requirements, state implementation programs, and emissions permit requirements affecting manufacturers.

The NAM and other organizations also filed a separate petition to review the EPA's tailoring rule. On March 10, 2015, the D.C. Circuit ruled that EPA's rules are vacated in part, consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Utility Air Regulatory Grop v. EPA.

The NAM's successful challenge to EPA's authority to regulate virtually all manufacturers that emit greenhouse gases was sent back from the Supreme Court to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to determine what to do with regulations that are still printed in the Code of Federal Regulations, but that exceed EPA's regulatory authority. All of the parties that challenged EPA's authority, including state governments, industry associations, and public interest groups, filed a motion with the court, as has EPA, recommending what to do next.

EPA's motion proposed that the court declare the "regulations under review are vacated to the extent they require a stationary source to obtain a PSD [or Title V] permit if greenhouse gases are the only pollutant [that would trigger construction or modification review." It also says the court should direct it to rescind or revise the regulations to reflect the Supreme Court's decision. The agency does not believe it should establish a de minimis threshold for greenhouse gas regulation, but instead wants to rely on the 75,000 tons per year threshold currently on the books.

Industry's motion, by contrast, argued that the Court invalidated EPA's regulations to the extent they "treat greenhouse gases as a pollutant for purposes of defining" PSD and Title V applicability. As a result, EPA must vacate those rules, namely the Tailoring Rule, the Timing/Triggering Rule (to the extent EPA relied on it), and other challenged rules it relied on. EPA's interpretation of its authority was neither compelled nor allowed by law, so in effect it must start over. It should also decide on a de minimis threshold for regulation.

Final briefs in response to each motion were filed November 21, 2014.

On April 10, 2015, the court issued an amended order that:

"(1) the regulations under review (including 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.166(b)(48)(v) and 52.21(b)(49)(v)) be vacated to the extent they require a stationary source to obtain a PSD permit if greenhouse gases are the only pollutant (i) that the source emits or has the potential to emit above the applicable major source thresholds, or (ii) for which there is a significant emissions increase from a modification; (2) the regulations under review be vacated to the extent they require a stationary source to obtain a title V permit solely because the source emits or has the potential to emit greenhouse gases above the applicable major source thresholds; and (3) the regulations under review (in particular 40 C.F.R. § 52.22 and 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.12, 71.13) be vacated to the extent they require EPA to consider further phasing-in the requirements identified in (1) and (2) above, at lower greenhouse gas emission thresholds."

The court also ordered EPA to rescind or revise the applicable rules "as expeditiously as practicable," and to "consider whether any further revisions to its regulations are appropriate in light of UARG v. EPA . . . and if so, undertake to make such revisions."

The NAM and 8 other business associations filed an amicus brief supporting Murray Energy's challenge to EPA's proposed rule to substantially regulate greenhouse gas emissions from existing power plants. According to the EPA, the rule's annual compliance costs will reach at least $7.3 billion by 2030, and manufacturers will see dramatic electricity cost increases and less reliable service as a result.

The NAM amicus brief argued that Section 111(d)(1) of the Clean Air Act prohibits EPA from setting performance standards for sources that are already regulated under Section 112. EPA's interpretation would create double regulation, making power plant operation more expensive and conflicting with the purpose of Section 111(d). The statutory language is not ambiguous, and EPA's interpretation should not be given deference by the courts.

On June 9, 2015, the Court dismissed the challenge because the EPA has not taken final agency action that would allow a court to review it. The criteria under the All Writs Act for issuing an order against EPA's plans are not met, and the fact that some companies may be incurring costs in anticipation of the final rule does not justify court intervention.

This case involves the statutory obligations of the EPA to set maximum achievable control technology (MACT) standards for emissions under Clean Air Act Sec. 112(d)(6), specifically for chromium electroplating and anodizing operations. EPA is in the early stages of implementing that section, which applies when EPA reviews standards every 8 years. Because this review process applies to many other substances regulated by EPA, the decision in this case will extend far beyond chromium use.

At issue is what the statute requires of EPA when determining whether to tighten an existing standard. The NAM filed an amicus brief arguing that the statute specifically requires EPA to revise a standard, when conducting a technology review, only when "necessary (taking into account developments in practices, processes, and control technologies)." In this case, EPA's approach did not square with the plain statutory requirements, because it identified no "development" in emissions control measures that necessitates the new, more stringent standards it adopted.

We also oppose an effort by environmental groups to have EPA recalculate existing standards using procedures in Sec. 112(d)(2) and (3) for initial MACT standard-setting. Those procedures for new standards are not constrained in the same way that 8-year reviews are. As a result, EPA will lower emissions limits because companies complying with new standards try to build in a compliance margin when they buy new equipment, and that commendable over-performance raises the bar and leads EPA to lower the limits when the standard is reviewed. EPA's longstanding position is that it is not required to re-set the existing MACT standards each time it conducts a Sec. 112(d)(6) review, and that it is not required to use procedures under Sec. 112(d)(2) and (3) for periodic reviews, yet it did so in this case.

On July 21, 2015, a 3-judge panel rejected both industry and environmental group challenges to the review. It declined to require EPA to determine a new MACT floor each time it reviews a MACT rule, as environmental groups had wanted. But it also rejected industry arguments challenging the extent of technological developments that have occurred since the first rule was issued. It found that developments include improvements in performance of some technologies, which EPA found.

The NAM and other industry organizations filed a petition with a federal appeals court to review a final rule on non-hazardous secondary materials (NHSM) issued by the EPA on February 7, 2013, entitled “Commercial and Industrial Solid Waste Incineration Units: Reconsideration and Final Amendments; Non-Hazardous Secondary Materials That Are Solid Waste, Final Rule”. The rule was written to identify whether NHSMs are solid waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act when used as fuels or ingredients in combustion units. Further details about the legal claims in this litigation will be filed with the court shortly.

This case was consolidated on June 7, 2013. For more information click here.

This is the appeal of an adverse ruling from the district court judge in our suit challenging the SEC's conflict minerals rule. Click here for details on that ruling.

Our appeal was expedited, and focused on largely the same issues that were before the trial judge. Review was de novo, which means that the appeals court looks at the case fresh, without any presumption that the trial court's ruling is binding on them.

The NAM, joined by the Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, argued that the SEC incorrectly interpreted the statute, which requires reporting of certain minerals that "did originate" in and around the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), to cover minerals that "may have originated" there. It also failed to recognize and use its power to establish a reasonable de minimis exception for small amounts of minerals, which could provide substantial relief from the burdensome requirements of the rule for thousands of manufacturers. We also raised an important First Amendment objection to the requirement that companies make misleading and stigmatizing public statements unfairly linking their products to terrible human rights abuses.

We filed our main brief on the merits on Sept. 11, and our reply Nov. 13, 2013. Oral argument was held on Jan. 7, 2014, during which counsel for the SEC faced difficult questioning about the SEC's rule and the First Amendment objections.

On April 14, the court deferred to the SEC on its interpretations of the substantive provisions included in the rule, but overturned the requirement that companies disclose that their products are not "DRC conflict free." The First Amendment prohibits the requirement that companies report to the SEC and post on company web sites the fact that certain manufactured products are not “conflict free”. This constitutes government-compelled speech. It is now up to the SEC to determine what reporting requirement to impose and what to do while it is making that decision, since the first reports under the regulation must be filed by June 2, 2014. If it tries to formulate alternative reporting requirements, it may need to revist the whole public reporting aspect of the rule through a new round of notice-and-comment rulemaking.

On April 29, the NAM, Chamber and Roundtable filed a motion with the SEC to stay the rule or at least filing deadline. The whole point of the rule and the statute was to try to effect social change by shaming companies who cannot label their products as "DRC conflict free," and since the shaming mechanism has been struck down, the remainder of the rule has questionable benefits. Moreover, there are a host of questions without easy answers that must be considered before imposing enormous costs on industry. The SEC will have to determine what type of disclosure should replace the unconstitutional requirement, whether that would require changes to other provisions of the rule, re-analyze the costs and benefits of the rule, and provide for notice-and-comment rulemaking. Finally, requiring some type of truncated report is an approach that will not serve the law's intended purpose and will worsen the massive uncertainty and confusion among those who are subject to the rule.

The same day, Keith Higgins, director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, issued a statement saying that companies will still need to file their first reports by the due date and address those portion of the rule that the court upheld. He added that "No company is required to describe its products as 'DRC conflict free,' having 'not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free,’' or 'DRC conflict undeterminable.' If a company voluntarily elects to describe any of its products as 'DRC conflict free' in its Conflict Minerals Report, it would be permitted to do so provided it had obtained an independent private sector audit (IPSA) as required by the rule. Pending further action, an IPSA will not be required unless a company voluntarily elects to describe a product as 'DRC conflict free' in its Conflict Minerals Report.

We also released a statement April 30 saying in part that "Congress and the SEC need time to evaluate how to amend the statute and/or the rule in light of the court's decision. Given the significant issues involved, we believe that it is in everyone's interest to stay the rule until these issues can be fully analyzed and addressed. Accordingly, we will ask the DC Circuit to grant a full stay of the rule until the implications of the decision are clear to all parties."

On May 2, 2014, the SEC issued a partial stay of the portion of the rule that requires issuers to disclose that any of their products have "not been found to be “DRC conflict free.'" It denied our request that the entire rule be stayed. The Commission did not, however, stay the effective date (June 2) for complying with all the other requirements of the rule. Companies are struggling to determine the meaning of the SEC’s action and what to do. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in our challenge to the rule means that the case will be sent back to the trial judge to determine whether to vacate the rule in its entirety or provide some other remedy.

Because this litigation was ongoing and the SEC had not voluntarily stayed the implementation of the rule, the NAM and other business organizations went back to the D.C. Circuit on May 5 and filed an emergency motion for stay of the rule in its entirety until the trial court has addressed the unresolved questions.

We argued that the rule’s compelled confessions, which have been declared unconstitutional, constitute the entire basis for the rule, imposing astronomical costs on affected companies. It makes no sense to enforce a rule that no longer achieves its goals and that likely will be vacated, and a stay would avoid “forcing companies to implement interim procedures for filing truncated reports under unilateral staff guidance that is subject to change at any time.”

On May 14, the court denied our motion for a stay. Companies must now comply with the modified filing requirements by June 2.

On May 29, both the SEC and Amnesty International asked the D.C. Circuit to hold any further appeals until after it ruled in the American Meat Institute v. USDA case, which it did on July 29. On Aug. 15, Amnesty International supplemented its brief in support of a petition for rehearing en banc, and on Aug. 28, the Court ordered us to file a response. We filed it on Sept. 12, arguing that the standards for rehearing this case have not been met, and that the court's decision in the American Meat Institute case was limited to "purely factual and uncontroversial" disclosures, not disclosures like the ones required by the conflict minerals regulation. The disclosures in this case, according to the judges who ruled on them, require an issuer "to tell consumers that its products are ethically tainted, even if they only indirectly finance armed groups," or even if the issuer is merely unable to determine their origin.

On Nov. 18, the 3-judge panel agreed to rehear this case, and asked for further briefing on the impact of the decision in American Meat Institute v. USDA, as well as the meaning of "purely factual and uncontroversial information" and whether that determination is a question of fact for the court. The SEC filed its brief on December 8, and ours was filed December 29. Oral arguments were not held.

The 3-judge panel finally ruled on Aug. 18, 2015, that the compelled disclosures are unconstitutional. It ruled that the looser standard of review under the Zauderer case does not apply here, because that case involved only voluntary commercial advertising, not government-compelled statements about products. But even if this looser standard of review applied, the government must have a sufficient interest in mandating disclosures, and the rule must be effective in achieving its objectives. Instead, whether the law will decrease the revenue of armed groups in the DRC and diminish the humanitarian crisis there "is entirely unproven and rests on pure speculation." No hearings were held on the impact of the law prior to enactment, and later hearings were inconclusive. This is an insufficient justification to compel speech under the First Amendment.

The majority also analyzed the part of the ruling in the American Meat Institute case and found that determining whether compelled speech is about "purely factual and uncontroversial information" is a puzzling exercise, but that the SEC's requirement to label products as "conflict free" or not is hardly factual and non-ideological. Instead, it ethically taints products and stigmatizes companies in violation of the First Amendment. The SEC and Amnesty International petitioned for rehearing before the full D.C. Circuit court, but that request was denied, and the case was not appealed to the Supreme Court.

On June 16, 2011, the NAM filed a petition for review of the EPA’s Non-Hazardous Secondary Materials (NHSM) rule under the suite of Boiler MACT rules. The NHSM rule will classify as solid waste certain “secondary” materials that are currently used as a source of energy, such as coal ash or biomass residues from lumber. Solid waste must be burned in boilers regulated under more onerous rules than apply to fuels. The NAM is concerned with several aspects of the rule, including its effect on the use of non-hazardous materials, its presumption that all non-hazardous secondary materials are solid waste, and other provisions.

A list of legal issues in the case was filed, including challenging EPA's presumption that all non-hazardous secondary materials are solid waste, and its definition of "contaminants," "traditional fuels," and "contained gaseous material." Also at issue, among other things, is whether EPA violated the Regulatory Flexibility Act by failing to consider the economic impacts of the rule on small businesses.

In 2013, National Ass'n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA was consolidated with the NAM suit into Solvay USA Inc. v. EPA. Our main brief on the merits, filed 4/28/2014, raised 4 key challenges to EPA's rule: (1) that EPA improperly decided that transferring alternative fuels to third parties for combustion is a discard and therefore such fuels are solid wastes, (2) that EPA improperly classified as solid waste alternative fuels such as those made from construction and demolition wood, railroad ties, and other treated woods that have heating value, are managed as valuable fuel, and are processed to create new fuel products, (3) that EPA improperly classified as solid waste alternative fuels such as paper recycling residuals, even though the record demonstrates no discard has occurred and the combustion is an integral part of an industrial process or functionally equivalent to a traditional fuel, and (4) that EPA improperly classified as solid waste sewage sludge when combusted even though the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) prohibits such a classification.

The practical effect of EPA's rule is that alternative fuel that could have been productively combusted will be managed as a waste and can only be combusted in a solid waste incinerator under much more expensive rules, leading to an enormous increase in landfill disposal, which has its own set of environmental harms.

Our brief as intervenors was filed Aug. 29, 2014, and emphasized that EPA could find under RCRA that discarded material could be recovered and processed into a non-waste fuel product, and that it could properly classify as non-wastes scrap tires, used oil, pulp and paper residuals, construction and demolition debris and other traditional fuels.

On June 3, 2015, the Court of Appeals denied Solvay’s petition for review as well as those of the environmental groups that challenged the rule. The court reasoned that the argument regarding sewage sludge is foreclosed by RCRA’s plain language and that EPA’s distinction between material burned by the generator and material transferred to a third party is consistent with RCRA and reasonable. It allowed EPA to place the burden on regulated entities to show that its material should not be regulated, because Congress wanted EPA "to err on the side of caution."

The court also rejected an environmental challenge to EPA's treating materials that are indistinguishable from virgin materials as non-waste fuel.

The NAM and 9 other groups filed an amicus brief in a case brought by a coalition of 12 states seeking to hold unlawful a 2011 settlement agreement between the EPA and some environmental groups which committed the agency to propose rules to regulate greenhouse gases from power plants. EPA proposed the rules in 2014, and this challenge began in July. Although the agency has not finalized its rules, this suit challenges the underlying settlement agreement.

The EPA rules impose new compliance costs on utilities that already must bear $9.6 billion per year in costs under the 2012 rule on hazardous air pollutants. Manufacturers of energy inputs will see sales decline precipitously as power plants cut costs or shut down. Manufacturers of all kinds, as purchasers of electricity, will see dramatic cost increases and electric service will become less reliable.

In our amicus brief, we argued that EPA may not regulate power plants under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act because power plants are already regulated under Section 112, and the law specifically prohibits dual regulation under both sections. EPA tried to manufacture ambiguity by relying on an acknowledged congressional drafting error. EPA should not be entitled to judicial deference when the statutory language itself is clear.

A similar case, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, is also pending in the D.C. Circuit, involving the same questions but challenging the proposed rules directly. We filed an amicus brief in that case on December 22. Oral arguments in both cases were held on April 16, 2015.

On June 9, 2015, the D.C. Circuit rejected West Virginia’s argument concerning the underlying settlement agreement and ruled for the EPA. The court held that West Virginia lacked standing to sue because the settlement agreement only set a timeline for the EPA to decide whether or not to issue a final rule and therefore did not create an injury in fact. Additionally, a suit to challenge such a settlement agreement must be filed within 60 days of the agreement’s publication in the Federal Register rather than more than two years later, as was the case here.

For 17 years Moving Waters Industries (MWI) fought the federal government in a False Claims Act (FCA) case. MWI is a small, family-owned manufacturer of water pumps used for irrigation and sanitation systems. The particular sale at issue in the case involved sale of pumps to Nigeria. Financing documents in the transaction required the disclosure of any commissions that were not “regular.” There was not an existing regulatory definition or guidance about what the term “regular” meant, so MWI applied what it thought was a reasonable interpretation—that a normal, longstanding, market rate commission was regular. Based on a complaint asserting that the commission was in fact “irregular,” the government pursued a civil FCA case.

The NAM filed this brief in support of MWI’s appeal of the lower court's finding of liability against MWI under the False Claims Act (FCA). The brief argued that FCA “falsity” cannot be established where the violation at issue stems from an ambiguous contract term and the defendant’s actions are consistent with a reasonable interpretation of that term. The FCA is intended to protect the government’s financial resources from fraudulent conduct. It is not meant to be a tool for resolving disputes between contractors and the government over the proper interpretation of unclear contract terms. In addition, a defendant cannot be found to have acted "knowingly" under the FCA, which can include acting in "reckless disregard" of truth or falsity, if the defendant employed a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous term.

In an opinion that will have far-reaching implications for all industries subject to potential FCA claims, on November 24, 2015, the DC Circuit found that the FCA was not intended to impose liability for an innocent, good faith mistake about the meaning of an applicable regulation. This outcome is an important victory for due process, and highlighted the fundamental unfairness of subjecting parties to liability for violating a rule without first providing notice of what the rule requires.

On July 23, 2012, the NAM filed a brief in support of Verizon’s fight against net neutrality, which constitutes rate regulation, requiring Internet Service Providers to carry the internet traffic of "edge" providers free of charge and effectively prohibiting paid prioritization of certain traffic streams. This is the second time the FCC has had to defend its attempt to impose net neutrality, with the first attempt ending in the court's finding in Comcast Corp. v. FCC that the Commission did not have legal authority to enforce such principles.

The brief in this case argued that rules for net neutrality were again not within the authority of the FCC. The Commission apparently found that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 endowed it with sweeping authority to regulate the internet, despite the fact that Congress never actually did so. Even if the FCC has the authority to regulate broadband Internet access, the provisions for regulation only allow it to take steps to make the markets more competitive. Numerous economists, including one that was formerly with the FCC, declared that net neutrality will not help make markets more competitive. In addition, the agency relied on unsupported speculation that regulation would lead to increased deployment of the internet, while the evidence before it overwhelmingly demonstrated that net neutrality regulations would inhibit deployment, interfering with business operations.

The NAM supports increased deployment of broadband internet services without unnecessary and burdensome regulations and efficient spectrum management issues. Policymakers should remove barriers to entry, remove regulations that dampen investment incentives, rely on industry practices that promote transparency and enhance consumer and business choices, and ensure technology-neutral competition for all providers.

On Jan. 14, 2014, the court sent back to the FCC its non-discrimination and no-blocking requirements on the basis that they improperly constitute common carriage regulation of broadband services. It found that the agency had the authority to regulate broadband internet service, and upheld the Commission's authority to adopt Open Internet rules. But the FCC improperly applied non-discrimination and no-blocking requirements to Internet Service Providers, which are not common carriers subject to such provisions.

This is an appeal of a decision dismissing claims by an environmental group that would force the government to impose further greenhouse gas emissions reduction policies under a "public trust" theory. The NAM intervened in the case in the trial court and helped obtain the favorable ruling there.

For a full summary of our arguments in the district court, click here.

In our appeals court brief, joined by various trucking and construction companies and associations, we argue that the public trust doctrine is a state law doctrine and does not implicate a federal question subject to jurisdiction in the federal courts. The case also presents a political question that is not for the courts to decide, putting the courts in the position of adopting air emission standards of general applicability and monitoring compliance. No court has ever used the public trust doctrine to compel a regulatory action by the federal government, much less a sweeping new regulatory agenda of the type sought here. In addition, the parties bringing suit do not have standing, because their alleged injuries are not imminent and particularized, nor are they fairly traceable to the defendants or likely to be lessened by any court order.

The court decided not to hear oral arguments in the case, and on June 5, 2014, affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims. It found that the plaintiffs did not present a federal question, and that the court therefore did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. There was no federal question because the claims were based on the legal theory of public trust, which is entirely a state law issue.

The NAM intervened in this case to help block this attempt to use the courts to do an end run around the legislative and regulatory processes that govern regulation of emissions from manufacturing plants. This result is an important development in reining in these kinds of aggressive legal theories and litigation tactics.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, which declined to hear the case on 12/8/2014.

The NAM and other organizations filed another petition to review an EPA action that is part of its suite of regulations of greenhouse gases from stationary sources. One of our initial suits in this series challenged the EPA's effort to regulate light-duty vehicles, because the agency used that rule as a predicate for further regulation of manufacturing facilities. We challenged this latest rule, published Oct. 15, 2012, as well. The case was consolidated with Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc. v. EPA (No. 12-1428, D.C. Cir.), but that case was voluntarily dismissed, and our challenge was severed and held in abeyance pending a decision from the Supreme Court in UARG v. EPA. After that ruling, we stipulated a dismissal of this case.

The NAM and 17 other business associations moved to intervene in a lawsuit brought by the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) against the EPA over the agency's interpretation of when greenhouse gases become "subject to regulation" (STR) under the Clean Air Act. CBD is expected to argue that greenhouse gases were already subject to regulation before EPA issued the "Johnson memo" in 2008 and a subsequent STR rule in April, 2010. If such a claim is accepted by a federal court, thousands of members of the business associations could be forced to obtain permits for new or existing facilities and to install costly control technology to try to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

On July 18, 2014, after the Supreme Court's decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, this case was voluntarily dismissed.

On March 15, 2013, the NAM filed a petition for the U.S. Court of Appeals to review the EPA's latest regulation of particulate matter. The regulation, published on Jan. 15, lowered the primary annual National Ambient Air Quality Standard for particulate matter from 15 to 12 micrograms per cubic meter. The NAM had urged EPA to retain the existing standard, but the agency opted to move forward with a more aggressive and damaging regulation.

NAM's President and CEO Jay Timmons said that the "new standard will crush manufacturers' plans for growth by restricting counties' ability to issue permits for new facilities, which makes them less attractive for new business. Essentially, existing facilities will have to be shuttered for new facilities to be built in these areas. This is not a conducive way to create jobs."

Our opening brief, filed 8/19/13, focused on whether EPA prejudged the need for the rule and the range of outcomes from the rulemaking process, whether it ignored a substantial body of contrary scientific evidence that does not support lowering the standard, whether its decision to require monitoring devices along roadways was unlawful because it will record maximum rather than ambient particulate matter concentrations, and whether the rule is invalid because EPA failed to provide implementation rules needed to address the legal consequences that flow from it.

The brief recounts the history of EPA's regulation of particulate matter. It notes that promulgation of the rule triggered immediate implementation obligations and started the clock on numerous others, yet many key implementation issues are unresolved. First, EPA has not approved a computer model to demonstrate compliance with the standard, which is typically how companies demonstrate compliance. Second, there are technical problems with the two methods approved by EPA for testing particulate matter emissions that have led EPA to recognize their limitations, indicating that reliable test methods are several years away. Third, EPA has not provided full guidance to the states about how to designate the boundaries of nonattainment areas, which could lead to improper designations and further burdens on manufacturers. Other issues are also highlighted.

On May 9, 2014, the Circuit Court denied NAM’s petitions. On each issue, the court deferred to EPA’s process and decisions. Although we challenged EPA’s lowering of the threshold for particulate matter, the court decided that EPA provided reasonable scientific explanations to justify making the standards more stringent. We also challenged EPA’s elimination of the “spatial averaging” test to determine particulate matter standards. Spatial averaging entails gathering data from several sites within a specified area and then averaging the results to determine the level of emissions in that area. EPA reasoned that spatial averaging would cause certain specific areas within a larger area to be out of compliance. Lastly, the court determined that EPA has the authority to protect air quality, and therefore it may place monitors in all areas, including along heavily traveled metropolitan roads, to accurately determine air quality.

In sum, this decision shows that courts continue to be reluctant to second-guess EPA regulations. Lowering the particulate matter levels will increase costs and harm competitiveness. The court’s unilateral deference to EPA’s justifications for lowering the levels underscores the importance of participation in the rulemaking process to combat future EPA regulations.

There’s a law that prevents agencies from charging ahead with regulatory changes without seeking input from the public and the regulated community. It’s called the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and it was designed to require agencies that want to make significant changes to their regulations to publish the proposed changes and answer criticisms on the record.

In 2009, the Environmental Protection Agency announced -- through a series of memoranda and letters -- a new system of review for certain Clean Water Act permits. These permits, called Section 404 permits, are needed by anyone that wants to build or modify a facility or undertake some other construction project that might have an effect on waters subject to federal jurisdiction. EPA later issued lengthy guidance making substantive changes to the requirements for permits for surface coal mining, also without going through notice-and-comment rulemaking.

The National Mining Association sued, and a federal district judge ruled that EPA had overstepped its authority and violated the APA. That ruling has been appealed to the D.C. Circuit, and the NAM and other business organizations filed an amicus brief supporting the trial judge’s decision. The brief described numerous instances where EPA and other regulatory agencies have issued regulatory requirements -- posing as guidance – that should be adopted by notice-and-comment procedures.

On July 11, 2014, the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that the "Enhanced Coordination Process" and Final Guidance were procedural, not legislative rules, and therefore not subject to the APA. It also ruled that a court challenge was premature because the Final Guidance was not actually final agency action subject to litigation, because it did not subject regulated parties or state enforcement agencies to any requirements or liabilities. The Guidance can be legally ignored. If it is actually used to grant or deny a permit in the future, a law suit might then be appropriate.

The upshot of this ruling is that EPA can create guidance documents that regulated parties can legally ignore, but they do so at the risk of having to litigate over EPA's use of such guidance documents after a permit is denied. Changing regulatory requirements with guidance documents casts American businesses adrift in uncharted territory in terms of regulatory risk and stymies investment and economic growth. Agencies that fail to use proper rulemaking procedures make decisions without the insight, data and information of the regulated public, including the practical implications of alternative policy choices.

Several environmental groups sued EPA over its emission standards for hazardous air pollutants from cement plants. They argued that amendments to the standards weaken and delay compliance with an earlier rule, and that the agency must not allow an affirmative defense for manufacturers when malfunctions of industrial equipment occur. The NAM is part of the SSM Coalition, which filed an amicus brief supporting the affirmative defense. The environmental groups wanted a standard that regulated sources, including the best-performing sources, will be unable to meet at times despite their proper design, operation, and maintenance. As a result, manufacturers will face civil penalties for events beyond their control.

EPA took the position that malfunctions must be accounted for in standards which require maximum achievable control technology (MACT). To be achievable, MACT standards must be capable of being met on a regular basis, including under most adverse circumstances which can reasonably be expected to recur, including periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction. EPA may set different requirements during malfunction events than apply to normal operations of plant equipment.

Our brief argued that an affirmative defense to civil penalties that might arise from a malfunction is required by the Clean Air Act and was properly promulgated by EPA. Without the defense, companies would be subjected to citizen suits, as well as administrative penalties, for events beyond their control.

We also argued that EPA has the authority to adjust the compliance deadline when it modifies a MACT standard. Not allowing this authority would be hugely unfair to regulated sources and would ignore the reality that it can take up to three years or more to design, acquire, install and start up pollution control equipment or modified processes.

On April 18, 2014, the court unanimously ruled that EPA properly adopted the emissions-related provisions in the rule, but that it did not have the statutory authority to create an affirmative defense in civil suits against cement manufacturers where an unavoidable malfunction results in impermissible levels of emissions. It found that EPA reasonably read the statute to allow an increase in the emissions limits for particulate matter from cement-making kilns. It also found that EPA reasonably considered costs to industry with a comparative analysis of cost-effectiveness, rather than, as the environmental groups wanted, consider only whether a standard would be "too expensive for industry to achieve", that is, one that would essentially bankrupt the industry.

The court rejected environmental arguments that the compliance date for emissions of mercury, hydrochloric acid and hydrocarbons should be 2013. Because the standard for particulate matter changed in the new regulation, the court found that it would be irrational and even absurd to have different compliance dates for the different pollutants because of the technology involved. The new compliance date is September 2015.

Finally, it agreed with the environmental groups that EPA did not have the authority to establish an affirmative defense for companies whose emissions exceed the regulatory limits because of unavoidable malfunctions. Instead, private civil suits may be filed by those affected by the emissions, and it is up to the courts to decide whether to award damages. During court proceedings, EPA may seek to intervene, or file an amicus brief, stating its views about whether a company should be liable for such emissions. It is up to the courts to determine the scope of remedies available to plaintiffs, taking into consideration the company's compliance history and good faith efforts to comply, the duration of the violation, and other factors.

In the Deseret Power decision in 2008, the EPA Environmental Appeals Board rejected the Sierra Club's contention that preconstruction permits for new power plants must include "best available control technology" (BACT) for carbon dioxide, but sent the case back to the EPA to reconsider whether to impose the requirement under its discretionary authority, and to develop an adequate record for its decision. It encouraged the EPA to consider whether the issue in this case should be resolved "in the context of an action of nationwide scope, rather than through this specific permitting proceeding."

On Sept. 14, 2010, the court ordered the case held in abeyance pending the outcome of other greenhouse gas cases. Former EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson issued an interpretative guidance memorandum on Dec. 18, 2008, that concluded that PSD permits (for the Prevention of Significant Deterioration of air quality) do not need to include BACT limits for greenhouse gases. The Sierra Club challenged that guidance, while the NAM and other business organizations supported it.

Our motion to intervene, filed 2/13/09, outlined why this case will have a substantial impact on many manufacturers, and why the EPA, which represents the general public interest, will not adequately represent the interests of the business community.

On Feb. 17, 2009, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson granted a Sierra Club petition for reconsideration of the Johnson memo, and permitted public comment on the matter. The D.C. Circuit stayed the litigation.

On April 2, 2010, EPA completed its reconsideration of the Johnson memo and published a new "Subject to Regulation" notice that made January 2, 2011 the date on which greenhouse gas emissions were regulated. On June 9, EPA asked the court to hold the case in abeyance while other litigation over its GHG regulation was resolved. The NAM opposed this motion, saying that the issues in this case are being addressed in other greenhouse gas cases, and the environmental groups here should not be allowed to have a second chance to litigate should they lose in those other cases. We also opposed an effort to allow the Center for Biological Diversity to switch its challenge from those cases into this one, as that could create competing panels of judges reviewing the same issues. Ultimately, the case was held in abeyance and finally dismissed in 2014 after the Supreme Court ruled in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, partially upholding EPA regulation of greenhouse gases, but limited its scope under the PSD program.

This case is about how the EPA establishes standards for maximum achievable control technology (MACT) which is used to minimize the emission of pollutants into the air. It arose in the context of a new regulation on emissions of hazardous air pollutants from electric utilities, as well as industrial-commercial-institutional steam generating units. The 2012 "Utility MACT" regulation adopts a methodology that has broad implications for industries subject to existing MACT standards that may be revised, or new standards yet to be developed.

The NAM filed an amicus brief arguing that the EPA erred in adopting a "pollutant-by-pollutant" approach. Under that approach, the EPA cherry-picks emissions data from multiple sources and sets a MACT floor based on whatever source is deemed the "best" for each individual pollutant. This often means there is a different best performer for each pollutant, and no single source of emissions will be able to achieve the regulatory requirement. The NAM believes that these measurements need to be made from producers operating under practical conditions -- not individually measuring pollutants and not from sources ideally positioned to limit their pollution, as the EPA argues. The EPA's approach is like asking a decathlon champion to be able to win not only the overall decathlon, but all of the individual events as well.

In addition, we argued that the EPA must give meaningful consideration to costs in determining whether a particular standard is achievable. The Clean Air Act requires that the level of pollution reduction that the EPA specifies be achievable, and its methodology will severely curtail or eliminate operations. Some vendors are unwilling to offer guarantees that their pollution control technology will meet the new standards, and financing of new projects is jeopardized.

On 9/12/2012, the court ordered this case to be held in abeyance pending reconsideration of the new source standards now under way at the EPA. The agency stated that it intends to complete the reconsideration by March 2013. It said it would reconsider "measurement issues related to mercury and the data set to which the variability calculation was applied when establishing the new source standards for particulate matter and hydrochloric acid." See 77 Fed. Reg. 45968 (Aug. 2, 2012).

The case was settled in 2014 by stipulated agreement.

The American Meat Institute and others challenged a regulation from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) that requires country-of-origin labeling of meat, including where production of the meat (born, raised, or slaughtered) occurred. A primary issue in the case is whether the government-compelled disclosure violates the First Amendment by forcing companies to provide such detail about their products without advancing a sufficient governmental interest. The trial court rejected this claim, as did a 3-judge panel of the appeals court, and the full appellate court affirmed.

The issue in the case is "Whether, under the First Amendment, judicial review of mandatory disclosure of 'purely factual and uncontroversial' commercial information, compelled for reasons other than preventing deception, can properly proceed under Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985), or whether such compelled disclosure is subject to review under Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. PSC of New York, 447 U.S. 56 (1980)."

This case is all about the standard of court review for compelled speech about commercial products. The NAM filed an amicus brief arguing that Zauderer review, which makes it easier for the government to justify compelled speech, should be limited to situations involving consumer deception. Applying a stricter standard of review would not undermine disclosures aimed at protecting the public's health and safety, and the government can disseminate other relevant factual information itself without requiring companies to do so. Indeed, using a product's label to carry government messages could drown out a company's own messages about the product.

We also argued that even if the more deferential Zauderer-type review is accepted, the government must still show that the compelled disclosure is "purely factual and uncontroversial". Some compelled disclosures strongly imply that the product at issue is inferior or morally tainted, forcing companies to denounce themselves. It is critical that the government be held to a stricter standard of review under such conditions.

On July 29, the court ruled 9 to 2 to uphold the regulation. The majority found that First Amendment interests are much weaker for disclosure laws than for laws suppressing speech, and that the government had a substantial interest in requiring labels so that consumers can choose American products, long-standing labeling requirements can be extended to food items, and so that consumers can react in the event of a food-borne illness outbreak. It found the labeling purely factual and uncontroversial, and that the requirement did not restrict or chill commercial speech.

Two judges strongly dissented, saying the majority had decided to "bust the mainspring of commercial speech jurisprudence." These dissenters said that the First Amendment's protection from government coercion "has now been reduced to an eerie echo of a supermarket tabloid’s vacuous motto: the government may compel citizens to provide, against their will, whatever information '[i]nquiring minds want to know!'"

This case involves an employer who asked employees not to discuss their complaints about co-workers with others while an investigation was ongoing. The NLRB ruled that an employer violates employee union-organizing rights when it has such a blanket policy, and that employers must “first determine whether in any given investigation witnesses need protection, evidence is in danger of being destroyed, testimony is in danger of being fabricated, or there is a need to prevent a cover up.”

The NAM and other business groups submitted an amicus brief in support of the employer, stating that the NLRB was incorrect in its decision because the Board failed to take into account the challenges employers will now face when conducting an investigation. For example, with the Board’s decision an employer may not be able to uncover the entire story because employees will not come forward if they know the investigation is not confidential. Additionally, the amicus brief pointed out the Board ignored its previous decisions on investigations and overturned decades of its own precedent on the matter. The Board’s decision places an enormous burden on employers to justify the confidentiality of their investigations prior to interviewing all the witnesses or even assessing the situation.

The D.C. Circuit sent the case back to the NLRB. In June 2015, the NLRB again ruled the employer’s confidentially policy violated the NLRA, and Banner again appealed to the D.C. Circuit. The NAM also filed an amicus brief in the second appeal.

A company negotiated a consent decree with EPA over Clean Air Act requirements applicable to diesel engines, and later a subsidiary not involved in the consent decree sought and received EPA approval to import diesel engines. A few years later, EPA sued that company, claiming the engines, most of which were never imported into the United States, violated the consent decree. A federal judge ordered $72 million in penalties.

That ruling was appealed, with the company arguing that the consent decree did not apply to this separate company, that most of the engines were never subject to EPA jurisdiction, and that ambiguous consent decrees should be strictly construed so as not to impose liability unless it is clearly encompassed by the agreement.

The NAM filed an amicus brief urging the appeals court to reverse. We argued that consent decrees like this involve companies that waive their right to contest whether a violation occurred and whether accelerated remedial action is authorized by law. Companies need the certainty that a settlement provides, and courts should not be able to broaden the terms of the settlement to impose penalties beyond those in the consent decree for actions not subject to the EPA regulations at issue. The trial court's ruling undermines the finality of consent decrees that motivates companies to substantially waive their rights under the law.

Consent decrees are a common settlement tool for businesses to achieve a clear and final resolution to enforcement actions whose outcome is uncertain for both the government and the regulated entity. They sometimes incorporate requirements that go beyond what the law requires or what the court could order without the agreement of the parties, as well as waiver of judicial review of debatable issues. Because of uncertain liability and draconian potential penalties, most regulated entities have little practical alternative but to "dance to the EPA's tune" and settle. Consequently, settlements must provide a clear and reliable understanding of what will be required, and courts must be careful to construe the agreements as written.

The trial judge decided to impose a sanction that was not explicitly excluded from the consent decree and was beyond what the law requires. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed, ruling that the consent decree applied to engines made at a plant owned by Volvo Powertrain, and that the amount of the fine was not an abuse of the court's discretion.

Providers of international airline passenger service sued the Export-Import Bank of the United States for approving financing assistance for U.S.-manufactured goods sold to Air India. They contended that the Bank must first conduct a detailed individualized economic analysis of the potential indirect effects that might result for U.S. competitors operating in downstream markets where the foreign customer may provide services using the exported goods. Thus, the case is all about how much economic scrutiny the law requires the Ex-Im Bank to do before it may approve export financing for goods manufactured in the United States for export.

The NAM filed a brief 1/2/2013 support Ex-Im's process, whereby the statute requires it to more carefully scrutinize the impact on domestic manufacturers, but does not require as thorough a review for much more indirect effects in service industries. We highlighted the importance of Ex-Im's approval process and its role in supporting nearly 300,000 American jobs at more than 3,600 U.S. companies, large and small. Streamlined review procedures for export financing at the Bank are critical to enabling it to respond effectively and nimbly to the export credit financing provided by foreign governments. This is particularly important since the Bank labors under certain structural disadvantages in offering countervailing assistance, and further roadblocks imposed in litigation by private parties will jeopardize its flexibility and the competitiveness of American manufacturers.

We also provided the court with a detailed analysis of the Bank's statutory authority to establish the streamlined system it employs. It has broad discretion to craft such procedures as may be appropriate, and has extensive experience with the kinds of guarantees at issue in this case.

On 6/18/13, the court sent the case back to the Bank to explain why it created a categorical exclusion from scrutiny for loan guarantees to help a foreign company provide air travel services. It must show why such guarantees can never cause adverse effects to U.S. industries and U.S. jobs. After the Bank provides such information, the trial court is expected to take another look at the lawsuit to determine if the Bank has met its statutory requirements.

Mingo Logan Coal Co. challenged an EPA decision that it argued retroactively changed a Clean Water Act permit issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers four years earlier. This change withdrew certain creeks as disposal sites for dredged material, affecting the validity of a permit that EPA had previously reviewed and assented to, and even though the permit holder was in full compliance with it.

In March, 2012, a federal judge ruled that EPA did not have the power to revoke a valid permit -- only the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which issued the permit, has the authority to revoke it. The NAM filed an amicus brief in support of that result in the trial court, and that history is summarized here.

EPA appealed to the D.C. Circuit, and the NAM and other business groups filed a second amicus brief raising concerns about the substantial uncertainty that would be generated were EPA to have the power it claimed. The power to revoke a valid permit by EPA will substantially raise the stakes for any project that requires a Section 404 permit. That will distort the cost-benefit ratio and discourage new investments in any such project. The uncertainty from this looming threat will lead to higher interest rates and fewer investments, affecting downstream benefits such as job creation, housing, commercial space, food, consumer products, libraries and schools.

Unfortunately, the D.C. Circuit reversed the trial court on April 23, 2013. A 3-judge panel ruled that EPA has the final say on discharge site selection under Sec. 404(c) of the Clean Water Act. It can withdraw a specification of a stream as a suitable site for discharging dredged or fill material from a mountain-top mine at any time, including after a permit is issued. The withdrawal amends the terms and conditions specified in the permit. The court sent the case back to the trial court to resolve a remaining challenge -- whether EPA's decision was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.

The NAM is a member of the Ozone NAAQS Litigation Group, which in 2008 in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit challenged the validity of the EPA's final regulation lowering certain ozone limits under the Clean Air Act. The American Lung Association, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and others are also challenging the rule, arguing that the EPA did not follow the advice of their scientific advisers to issue a tougher standard. All the petitions were consolidated under the caption, Mississippi v. EPA.

On 3/19/09, the D.C. Circuit ordered the cases held in abeyance while the new Administration considered whether to change the standards. EPA proposed revisions in January, 2010, for public comment. The NAM filed comments in March (see link below).

On April 4, 2011, the court denied our motion to begin briefing those issues that were not the subject of reconsideration, and refused to order EPA to complete its reconsideration proceeding by the July 29, 2011 date by which EPA indicated it planned to take final action. EPA forwarded a final rule to the Office of Management and Budget in July. Five of the petitioners in this case moved 8/8/11 for a court order directing EPA to complete reconsideration immediately. The NAM coalition opposed this motion because the deadline for EPA to review the 2008 Ozone rule has not yet passed, and it need not act by any specific date. We also asked the court again to renew the briefing on this litigation.

On Sept. 2, President Obama announced that he was requesting that Administrator Jackson withdraw the draft ozone standard at this time. OIRA Administrator Cass Sunstein sent a letter to EPA explaining the reasons that he was sending the proposal back to EPA for reconsideration, including that "a new standard now is not mandatory" and new scientific work is underway and will be based on the best available science. Later that day, EPA filed a notice with the D.C. Circuit saying it "no longer expects that it will take final action to complete its reconsideration of the 2008 ozone NAAQS in the near future." It filed a revised motion to govern further proceedings on Sept. 12, seeking to resume briefing, which the court did.

The Ozone NAAQS Coalition filed its brief on April 17, 2012. Key arguments included: (1) the EPA's finding that increased protection results from a lower standard is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish that the revision is "requisite" under the statute, (2) new health evidence in 2008 does not materially differ from earlier evidence and does not support revising the standard, (3) the risks now are no greater than they were under the earlier standard, and (4) EPA misrepresented and used selective results from the latest clinical and epidemiological studies.

Our coalition filed a separate brief in July as intervenors in support of EPA defending challenges from environmental groups that the ozone standard is not stringent enough. The NAAQS standard for ozone is now at .075 ppm, and the studies EPA considered in setting this level did not support lowering it below .070 ppm, as demanded by the challengers. A clinical and some epidemiological studies did not produce any statistically significant results for levels below .080 ppm. We also supported EPA's decision regarding exposure and risk assessments.

The NAM filed a reply brief on Aug. 13 reiterating our position that the EPA did not have sufficient evidence in the record to justify its conclusion that the public health risk from ozone was any different in 2008 than it was in 1997 when it set the last ozone standard. It failed to justify why the 1997 standard was no longer “requisite,” as required by the statute, to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety. The agency also failed to rely on air quality criteria that accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge, and set secondary standards based on the defective primary standard.

The Court issued its decision on July 23, 2013, upholding the primary ozone standard of .075 ppm, but ordering EPA to provide further explanation for its secondary ozone standard, which applies to effects of ozone on such things as animals, vegetation, visibility, property and personal comfort and well-being. With respect to the primary ozone standard, the court applied the usual highly deferential standard of review which courts apply to challenges of regulations. It found that EPA set a standard that is "requisite" to protect the public with an adequate margin of safety, holding that "requisite" protection may change over time with different policy judgments and scientific knowledge. As long as EPA reasonably and rationally explains its actions, the courts will defer to those judgments. The court likewise rejected challenges from environmental groups, saying EPA was in a situation reminiscent of Goldilocks. It upheld the agency's decision, found that it had built in a reasonable margin of safety, and allowed the agency to depart from recommendations of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee because CASAC's opinion was a mix of scientific and policy considerations which EPA could decide differently.

In December, 2010, EPA announced its Finding of Substantial Inadequacy and SIP Call Rule for greenhouse gas emissions. It found that the laws of 13 states do not authorize them to regulate GHG emissions as is required as of January 2, 2011, and EPA requires those states to change their laws and submit revised State Implementation Plans (SIPs) for review and approval. In the meantime, EPA will use its own Federal Implemenation Plan (FIP) to regulate GHGs. The affected states are Arkansas, Arizona, parts of California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Oregon, Nebraska, Nevada (Clark County), Texas, and Wyoming.

The NAM and other associations that are part of the SIP/FIP Advocacy Group have petitioned two federal appeals courts to review EPA's action. This is another step in our overall challenge to EPA's efforts to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. We filed comments with EPA when this action was proposed, arguing that EPA's own regulations give the states 3 years to comply with the new greenhouse gas requirements, and that the state implementation plans are not "substantially inadequate" to enforce the new requirements.

A similar case was filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It was transferred to the D.C. Circuit. On 7/6/11, the court consolidated the cases into one but denied EPA's request that it be held in abeyance pending resolution of the main challenges to their greenhouse gas regulations.

On 2/8/2012, the SIP/FIP Advocacy Group filed its main brief, arguing that the Clean Air Act requires EPA to give the states 3 years to amend their SIPs to account for greenhouse gases. EPA sought, through unlawful intimidation, to coerce states to consent to GHG regulation immediately to avoid a threatened ban on new-source construction. EPA has never acted outside of these procedures, and it should be required to follow them. Until then, we ask the court to provide that no GHG-emitting sources be subject to any PSD (Prevention of Significant Deterioration) permitting requirements.

On 5/14/2012, NAM filed a reply brief arguing that EPA’s refusal to accept State Implementation Plans is invalid. EPA thinks that states may not issue preconstruction permits addressing greenhouse gases, and that EPA must take over the state's power and issue federal implementation plans. We argued that the states continue to have permitting authority and may take the time allotted by EPA regulations to implement the new greenhouse gas requirements.

On July 26, 2013, the D.C. Circuit ruled 2 to 1 that no party had standing to challenge EPA's actions because any harm was caused by the Clean Air Act and not by EPA's actions. It found that the Act's permitting requirements are self-executing and require permits for each pollutant subject to regulation under the Act even when the applicable SIP has not been updated to include requirements for newly regulated pollutants. The petitioners did not have standing, according to the majority, because a victory for them would leave them worse off than with the rules, because there would be a construction ban in those states without a SIP for greenhouse gases. The court's ruling applies to Texas v. EPA as well.

The NAM is part of the SIP/FIP Advocacy Group, which comprises various national trade associations challenging EPA's efforts to require states to implement its greenhouse gas stationary source regulatory requirements. This suit is in response to EPA's decision, published May 3, 2011, partially disapproving Texas' implementation plan for regulating pollution. EPA rejected part of the Texas plan because it did not address how it would apply to pollutants that become "subject to regulation" in the future, such as greenhouse gases. Because it rejected the Texas plan, EPA moved to implement federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in Texas.

The State of Texas and other parties also filed suit against EPA, and our case has been consolidated with those. For further action in this case, click here.

The NAM and four other business organizations filed an amicus brief supporting the State of Texas in its lawsuit seeking an emergency stay of EPA’s decision partially revoking the State’s permitting authority under its Clean Air Act implementation plan. EPA took over the Texas permitting authority without notice-and-comment rulemaking on the premise that without intervention many stationary sources of greenhouse gas emissions in Texas would have to forgo construction and modification in 2011. But there was no construction ban in Texas, and EPA's intervention was not needed to prevent one.

EPA took the action in late December, 2010, after the Texas Clear Air Act implementation plan had been on the books for 18 years. EPA believes that its new greenhouse gas rules require large stationary sources of GHG emissions to obtain PSD (Prevention of Significant Deterioration) permits before beginning construction or undertaking modifications of their facilities. Most states automatically incorporate new EPA pollutants in their state plans, but Texas does not, and EPA believes Texas will not act promptly to do so. Our brief, however, argued that PSD permit requirements are not automatically incorporated into a state's implementation plan. Thus, a court may stay EPA's latest regulatory control tactic without interfering with the continuing process by which Texas issues construction and modification permits for stationary sources of emissions.

On Jan. 12, 2011, the Court granted our motion to file an amicus brief, but denied the motion for a stay. EPA's regulatory action continued in force during the litigation.

On June 18, 2012 the NAM, as part of the SIP/FIP Advocacy Group, filed its main brief to support Texas’ State Implementation Plan (SIP) against the EPA’s actions to deny it. Our brief argued that EPA cannot override the Texas SIP any time it finds fault or shifts its policy direction. EPA should not expand its powers by using legislation that was intended merely to correct clerical or technical errors in prior laws. In addition, the EPA should not have reviewed the SIP, as it was compliant with the Clean Air Act when it was implemented. Finally, we argued that EPA ignored the requirement to give notice and an opportunity to comment on rule changes.

These steps by EPA are causing harm to Texas and manufacturers, as they require businesses to obtain permitting from both the state and the federal government, and have effectively destabilized investments in Texas businesses affected by the standards.

On July 26, 2013, the D.C. Circuit ruled 2 to 1 that no party had standing to challenge EPA's actions because any harm was caused by the Clean Air Act and not by EPA's actions. It found that the Act's permitting requirements are self-executing and require permits for each pollutant subject to regulation under the Act even when the applicable SIP has not been updated to include requirements for newly regulated pollutants. The petitioners did not have standing, according to the majority, because a victory for them would leave them worse off than with the rules, because there would be a construction ban in those states without a SIP for greenhouse gases.

On Sept. 22, 2014, we petitioned the court to rehear this case, arguing that its decision directly conflicted with the Supreme Court's recent decision in UARG v. EPA. The Supreme Court ruled that the Clean Air Act cannot be interpreted to automatically require a source to obtain a PSD permit on the sole basis of its potential greenhouse gas emissions when those emissions became regulated pollutants. Because the requirements are not self-executing, the D.C. Circuit's decision based on that finding are insupportable. EPA could not reject state implementation plans that did not regulate major sources of greenhouse gases because its own regulations were not authorized.

The court ordered responses to the petition for rehearing, which were filed on November 4. On May 4, 2015, the court denied the petitions.

On 7/31/2012, the NAM and 14 other business associations filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in this consolidated case involving the regulation of hours of service for commercial truck drivers. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) issued new rules in December, 2011, and lawsuits were filed by the American Trucking Associations challenging provisions relating to rest periods and non-driving work, and by Public Citizen, challenging the 14-hour driving window and the 11-hour daily driving provision. We supported ATA's case and opposed Public Citizen's.

Our brief noted that even small changes in the Hours of Service rules have an effect on the complex and interwoven distribution systems involving scheduling, logistics, route planning, and inventory control. We supported the effort to overturn that portion of the rules that changed the 34-hour restart provisions, as the changes were not supported by adequate evidence in the rulemaking record. The agency failed to consider substantial costs on entities other than motor carriers, such as manufacturers, and failed to consider the effects of the rule changes on night drivers, congestion, and safety. In addition, a requirement that drivers go off-duty for 30-minute breaks, rather than to log the break time as "on-duty, not driving" will impose significant costs on shippers, receivers and consumers.

The NAM brief supported the agency's decision to retain an 11-hour driving time limit. Evidence in the record justified this limit, and the costs of lowering the limit would significantly outweigh any purported benefits.

The NAM filed comments with FMCSA in March, 2011, supporting the 11-hour driving limit and opposing changes that would have a negative impact on supply chains, distribution operations and productivity.

On 8/2/13, the court upheld most of the rules. It upheld the 11-hours daily driving limit, the prohibition on driving after 8 hours on duty without a 30-minute break, and the requirement that the 34-hour reset may only be used once a week and must include two periods of 1:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. The court did accept the ATA's challenge to the 30-minute break requirement for short haul drivers, finding that the agency failed to explain and justify its decision. The decision largely relies on the principle that courts will generally defer to the decisions of regulatory agencies as long as there is a rational connection between the facts found and choice made, and the agency explains why it made the choices it did.

The NLRB has appealed a decision of a federal judge who ruled that it did not have a quorum when it promulgated its “ambush election” rule in 2011. The Coalition for a Democratic Workplace, of which the NAM is a leading member, challenged the rule. Click here for a summary of the proceedings in the trial court.

The NLRB filed its main brief on Nov. 16, and the Chamber and CDW filed their brief on Dec. 31, 2012. Oral arguments were scheduled before Judges Henderson, Brown and Kavanaugh, but the arguments were postponed and the case was held in abeyance pending resolution of the Noel Canning decision on whether the recess appointments to the Board were constitutional.

In December of 2013, the NLRB voluntarily dismissed its appeal in Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, the case in which the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found the Board’s expedited representation election rule invalid because the Board lacked a quorum when it issued the rule in December 2011.

The NAM has won a major victory for manufacturers that we have been fighting for since 2011. This win came from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, where we appealed a federal court ruling that upheld the NLRB's regulation that required employers to post in their workplaces a notice of the right of employees to organize into unions, bargain collectively, discuss wages, benefits and working conditions, jointly complain, strike and picket, or choose not to do any of these activities. For details on the district court proceedings, click here.

On 5/22/2012, the NAM filed a brief arguing 3 main issues. First, we challenged the fundamental authority of the Board to issue a posting rule at all. Congress never authorized notice-posting requirements, and rejected an express notice-posting amendment in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) while accepting notice-posting requirements in other labor laws.

Second, we again raised the argument that a mandate that private parties post government notices, without a clear statutory basis or compelling governmental interest, violates the First Amendment rights of employers as well as the balance of requirements spelled out in the NLRA.

Third, if the penalties for failing to post the required notice were themselves unlawful, the judge should have thrown out the entire regulation, because the NLRB did not intend for the posting requirement to stand on its own without enforcement teeth. The posting requirement was not severable from the enforcement provisions, and the entire regulation should fall.

We later filed a reply brief arguing that the NLRB failed to establish any statutory authority for the posting requirement. The Board had no authority to impose affirmative duties on employers who are charged with violations of the NLRA. The rule also violated the statutory provision which prohibits the Board from regulating expression that “contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit,” and violated employers’ First Amendment rights by forcing employers to communicate an unwanted editorial judgment to their employees.

On May 7, 2013, the D.C. Circuit agreed and overturned the NLRB regulation. It found that the rule's requirement that employers post a Government message requires an act of speech, and Section 8(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act declares that speech "shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under the provisions of this [Act], if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." Thus the rule itself violates Section 8(c) because it makes an employer's failure to post the Board's notice an unfair labor practice.

It also ruled that the Board could not consider noncompliance with the rule to be evidence of antiunion animus, since that is also an unfair labor practice based on protected speech. Finally, the court ruled that the Board did not have the authority to amend the statute of limitations for filing unfair labor practice charges. Unless Congress intended the statute of limitations to include exceptions, the NLRB cannot create them years after the law was enacted.

Because all three means of enforcing the Board's posting requirement were invalid, the court ruled that the posting requirement itself was invalid, because the NLRB would never have promulgated it in the first place without ways to enforce it. The Board did not want just voluntary compliance.

A concurring opinion from 2 of the 3 judges found that the Board did not have authority under Section 6 of the NLRA to issue the rule because the posting requirement was not necessary to carry out the Board's responsibilities. It may only issue regulations that are necessary to carry out its responsibilities. The law does not impose an obligation on employers to educate its employees on labor relations law. In addition, the NLRB was set up to handle complaints that are filed by others, not promulgate rules that are "so aggressively prophylactic as the posting rule."

On 7/22/13, the NLRB asked the full complement of judges on the D.C. Circuit to rehear this case. The NAM filed a brief in opposition, arguing that the Board failed to identify any conflict between the court's ruling and any other court decision that would warrant further review. We also noted that a majority of the panel that decided the case also ruled that the Board exceeded its statutory authority on other grounds which independently preclude enforcement of the poster rule. On Sept. 4, the court declined to rehear the case. The NLRB had 90 days to appeal to the Supreme Court, but it declined to do so. The D.C. Circuit's ruling is now final.

When OSHA proposed its latest version of the communication standard for hazardous chemicals in the workplace, it planned to give the standard full preemptive effect. Federal law prescribes the requirements for manufacturers to communicate hazards in their workplace, and the proposed regulation would allow no state law, regulation or litigation to hold manufacturers to a different standard.

That changed when OSHA issued the final rule in March of 2012. The rule preempts state laws and regulations, but does not preempt litigation. Consequently, trial lawyers will be able to file state failure-to-warn claims against companies even though the companies are in compliance with the very restrictive federal requirements.

The American Tort Reform Association filed suit, alleging that this narrowing of the preemption provision exceeded OSHA’s authority and the public was not provided an opportunity to comment on OSHA’s change of plans. The NAM filed an amicus brief support the challenge, arguing that we should have been afforded an opportunity to comment on the change in the rule’s preemption language, so that we could describe any conflicts there may be between state tort claims and the requirements of the hazard communication rule. In addition, we argued that OSHA’s decision contradicted firmly established law that state litigation is preempted by federal occupational safety regulations. Otherwise, manufacturers would be subjected to duplicative and possibly counterproductive regulation, whether through specific state laws or tort laws as applied through litigation in the courts.

Our brief included situations where manufacturers could be subjected to conflicting requirements between federal and state requirements, or requirements that might vary from state to state. For example, the federal regulation imposes a mandate to use the words “danger” or “warning” in different situations, and requires the use of specific pictograms for certain hazards. Any different requirement that a state judge or jury might feel would better warn about hazards would subject a manufacturer to tort liability for following the federal rule.

On 12/27/13, the court denied the petition, but in doing so provided language to make sure that OSHA does not try to use the new rule against preemption to improperly sway judicial rulings. The court concluded that both ATRA and OSHA “agree that OSHA has no authority to determine the preemptive effect of the OSH Act.” Rather, OSHA's statement on the preemptive effect in this instance is merely an “interpretive statement” that does not have the force of law. The result is that the standard is merely advisory since interpretive rules do not have the force and effect of law; and they are not accorded that weight in the adjudicative process.

The NAM filed its main brief on January 2013, in its court challenge to the conflict minerals rule issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in August 2012. The final rule imposes an unworkable, overly broad and burdensome system that will undermine jobs and growth and may not achieve Congress’s overall objectives. Our brief asked a federal appeals court to modify or set aside the rule, arguing that the SEC adopted one of the costliest rules in its history while rejecting alternative regulatory options that would have substantially reduced the costs. The SEC also misread the statute and imposed new burdens not required by Congress on far more companies than expected. The business community understands the seriousness of the conflict occurring in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the need to implement solutions to bring an end to the violence. However, while well intentioned, the SEC’s final rule goes too far, and business groups have suggested constructive ways to make the rule more workable.

Oral arguments, originally scheduled for May before Judges Henderson, Tatel and Griffith, were canceled. A D.C. Circuit decision on April 26, 2013 in American Petroleum Institute v. SEC held that the D.C. Circuit lacked jurisdiction over a petition for review quite similar to the one filed in this case, and that the case should first be heard by a federal district court. In light of this development, we moved to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and the D.C. Circuit agreed.. For details on proceedings in the district court, click here.

The NAM and 16 other business associations filed 4 petitions for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, challenging EPA regulations from 1978, 1980 and 2002 that are a part of EPA's effort to regulate greenhouse gases from stationary sources of emissions. No one anticipated that these previously issued rules would be used to mandate greenhouse gas permit requirements, but that is the interpretation EPA has adopted. Our legal challenge was consolidated under the case captioned American Chemistry Council v. EPA.

We also filed an administrative petition for reconsideration with EPA on the same rules. Our lawsuits and the administrative petition challenged each of the four older rules to the extent that EPA considers them to allow the regulation of pollutants such as greenhouse gases that are not subject to a National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS). Our administrative petition went into great detail regarding the grounds for our request (see Related Documents below). The petitions below also contain the text of the regulations that were challenged.

Our main brief on the merits was filed May 10, 2011, focusing primarily on the timeliness of the lawsuits and on the fact that EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act is unreasonable and creates absurd results.

Oral arguments were held Feb. 29, 2012.

We argued that Congress intended for EPA to require PSD permits only for facilities that can financially bear the substantial regulatory costs and which, as a group, are primarily responsible for deleterious emissions. The number of permits needed by facilities that meet these criteria was about 280 per year, a number consistent with congressional intent to limit the permit program to a manageable number. The greenhouse gas regulations, however, would require more than 81,000 PSD permits per year, according to the EPA, crushing EPA, state agencies and the economy.

EPA’s reading of the Clean Air Act is unlawful because it severs the link between the PSD permit program and the attainment of national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). We argued that PSD permits are only required for emissions of a “criteria” pollutant, such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides or lead, and then only if the emissions occur in an area that has attained compliance with national standards.

EPA’s interpretation also is flawed because it leads to requiring an absurd number of permits. Its interpretation was announced three decades ago, and this is the first time a court has been asked to scrutinize its lawfulness. Only now do sources emitting major amounts of GHGs have to get PSD permits, and now their complaints about EPA’s interpretation are ripe for judicial review.

The purpose of the PSD permitting program is to maintain air quality in areas of the country that have attained satisfactory levels of quality, hence the name "Prevention of Significant Deterioration". EPA sets ceilings for each of a number of specific pollutants, and requires permits for new facilities that might emit more of those pollutants into areas in attainment. Our brief argued that EPA is now forcibly making the PSD permit program an all-purpose regulatory program. However, to do so, we argued that EPA must first define greenhouse gases as criteria pollutants, and specify the maximum levels at which they may be present in attainment areas. It has not done so, and it is arguably impossible to set meaningful NAAQS levels for greenhouse gases.

On June 26, 2012, the 3-judge panel upheld all of the primary greenhouse gas regulations. It upheld the EPA’s endangerment finding as within its discretionary power and procedurally sufficient, it upheld the tailpipe rule as being required by law once the endangerment finding is made, it found that the business community lacked standing to challenge the timing and tailoring rules because those rules helped rather than hurt, and, while it found our challenge to earlier rules in 1978, 1980 and 2002 to be timely, it rejected our legal arguments and found EPA’s interpretation compelled by the statute.

On August 10, 2012, the NAM coalition filed a petition for rehearing en banc, asking that all the judges on the D.C. Circuit review the 3-judge panel's ruling. We argued that the panel relied on an unreasonable interpretation of the Clean Air Act to approve "the most sweeping expansion of EPA authority in the agency's history, for the first time covering a broad swatch of mobile and stationary sources of greenhouse gases and granting itself discretion to determine and revise the scope of the statute’s coverage, previously fixed by the statute’s explicit terms, for the indefinite future." The panel's ruling conflicts with Supreme Court decisions, produces absurd results, and could lead to annual cost increases of more than $20 billion upon full implementation.

On December 20, 2012, the D.C. Circuit denied our petition. Judges Brown and Kavanaugh filed separate dissenting opinions that supported our arguments. Such dissents are rare, sending a clear signal that significant legal issues remain to be addressed.

On April 18, 2013, the NAM filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari wth the U.S. Supreme Court and awaiting the Court's determination whether to hear the case. The NAM's involvement in thisw case is critical because no other petitioners have been found to have standing to challeng the PSD regulations and NAM members are adversely affected by EPA's overly burdensome requirements.

The EPA has been reconsidering whether to lower the limits on ozone emissions from stationary sources since early in 2010, and engaged in a lengthy reconsideration process. Finally, President Obama called on EPA to put aside their reconsideration of the existing standard. OIRA Administrator Cass Sunstein sent a letter to EPA explaining the reasons that he was sending the proposal back to EPA for reconsideration, including that "a new standard now is not mandatory" and new scientific work is underway and will be based on the best available science. EPA then withdrew its proposed regulation and terminated reconsideration of the March 2008 standards.

The American Lung Association, Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council and Appalachian Mountain Club sought court review of this decision. The Ozone NAAQS Litigation Group, of which the NAM is a member, moved to intervene in this litigation to support EPA's decision not to change the existing ozone limits at this time. Our participation is needed because EPA represents the "general public interest" and the agency may not adequately represent the interests of manufacturers in avoiding costly and burdensome emissions limitations. On Dec. 1, we filed an opposition to the ALA's motion to coordinate or consolidate this case with Mississippi v. EPA, involving the 2008 ozone standard. We argued that ALA's motion is premature, since EPA is considering filing a motion to dismiss, which, if granted, would moot other issues in the case.

On Feb. 17, 2012, the Court dismissed ALA's petition for review, saying that it "lacks jurisdiction over the agency's non-final decision to defer action on the 2008 voluntary revision of the national ambient air quality standards for ozone." This decision mooted all the other issues in the case. The court also adopted a briefing schedule for separate litigation challenging the 2008 standard.

On August 2, 2010, the NAM and 16 other business associations filed a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit challenging the EPA's final regulation that sets out its schedule for enforcing regulatory controls on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from stationary sources. The agency has previously announced that greenhouse gas emissions are subject to regulation beginning January 2, 2011, and the usual permit requirements of the PSD program (Prevention of Significant Deterioration) kick in. Because there are millions of facilities that fall under EPA's regulatory requirements, the agency has adopted the tailoring rule to focus its initial enforcement only on facilities with the largest amounts of GHG emissions.

This is the last of eight petitions filed by the NAM coalition of business organizations challenging EPA's efforts to regulate stationary sources of greenhouse gases.

Our lawsuit is the third in a series of suits challenging four EPA rules that together implement the greenhouse gas regulatory program. Our fundamental concern is over EPA's decision to automatically trigger PSD regulation of all stationary sources.

On Sept. 15, 2010, the NAM coalition filed a motion for a partial stay of the regulation of greenhouse gases from stationary sources of emissions. The court denied this motion in December.

On June 20, 2011, the NAM and several other industry associations filed the fourth major legal brief challenging the EPA’s regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. This brief argued, in part, that the EPA’s tailoring rule essentially rewrote parts of the Clean Air Act by changing clear, congressionally established numerical thresholds for pollutants that are subject to regulation. The brief reiterated that the Clean Air Act was never meant to regulate GHGs. As a result, the rules should be vacated and remanded.

Oral arguments in the case were held on Feb. 29, 2012.

On June 26, 2012, the 3-judge panel upheld all of the primary greenhouse gas regulations. It upheld the EPA’s endangerment finding as within its discretionary power and procedurally sufficient, it upheld the tailpipe rule as being required by law once the endangerment finding is made, it found that the business community lacked standing to challenge the timing and tailoring rules because those rules helped rather than hurt, and, while it found our challenge to earlier rules in 1978, 1980 and 2002 to be timely, it rejected our legal arguments and found EPA’s interpretation compelled by the statute.

On August 10, 2012, the NAM coalition filed a petition for rehearing en banc, asking that all the judges on the D.C. Circuit review the 3-judge panel's ruling. We argued that the panel relied on an unreasonable interpretation of the Clean Air Act to approve "the most sweeping expansion of EPA authority in the agency's history, for the first time covering a broad swatch of mobile and stationary sources of greenhouse gases and granting itself discretion to determine and revise the scope of the statute’s coverage, previously fixed by the statute’s explicit terms, for the indefinite future." The panel's ruling conflicts with Supreme Court decisions, produces absurd results, and could lead to annual cost increases of more than $20 billion upon full implementation.

On December 20, 2012, the D.C. Circuit denied our petition. Judges Brown and Kavanaugh filed separate dissenting opinions that supported our arguments. Such dissents are rare, sending a clear signal that significant legal issues remain to be addressed.

On April 18, 2013, the NAM filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court and awaiting the Court's determination whether to hear the case.

In February, 2010, the NAM and other business groups filed a petition in federal appeals court challenging the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) decision to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from stationary sources through the Clean Air Act. Joining the NAM on the petition were the American Petroleum Institute, the National Petrochemical & Refiners Association, the National Association of Home Builders, the Corn Refiners Association, the Brick Industry Association, the Western States Petroleum Association and the National Oilseed Processors Association.

On March 18, 2010, a group of 21 industry associations and chambers of commerce filed a motion to intervene in the NAM suit in support of our position. This group represents a wide cross-section of sectors around the country that will be severely affected by EPA's effort to regulate stationary sources of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.

A variety of other business groups and some states also challenged the endangerment finding. Some of these groups asked the EPA directly to reconsider its finding, but the agency turned down the request in July, 2010. In the endangerment case, industry's opening brief was filed on May 20, 2011. Because the court required that all non-state petitioners and intervenors file only one brief, the views of 80 parties were consolidated, and the resulting brief includes disparate arguments from a variety of interests.

The brief explains that EPA does not say what constitutes a “safe climate,” acceptable global temperature ranges, or “safe” levels of GHGs in the atmosphere, nor will anyone be able to judge whether or when EPA has ever achieved a congressionally defined goal. EPA will not be able to say that its action will reduce global temperatures or that a temperature reduction will avoid an actual danger to public health and welfare.

The brief focused on, among other things, key EPA errors relating to (1) construing its authority to produce absurd results, (2) failing to provide a rational basis for determining whether GHG regulations will mitigate a defined public health or welfare risk, (3) lumping together six pollutants without making separate determinations about the effects of each, (4) failing to consider future mitigation and adaptation steps that impact whether health and welfare are endangered, and (5) failing to follow statutory procedures, including consultation with its own Science Advisory Board.

Congress did not intend for EPA’s endangerment finding to produce absurd results, yet that is the effect of EPA’s finding. The EPA should not have used the endangerment finding to cause PSD permitting requirements, since those requirements apply to emissions whose harm is concentrated in a particular geographic area. It should have adopted a more restricted reading of the statute, instead of a broad reading that would be narrowed by the absurd results doctrine.

We also argued that EPA has no rational basis for treating all six GHGs from motor vehicle emissions as a single air pollutant. Automobiles do not emit 2 of the six pollutants, and each of the pollutants that are emitted has radically different heat-trapping properties. In addition, EPA’s use of a “CO2 equivalent” as a proxy for regulation of each gas individually unlawfully avoids having to make endangerment findings for five of the six GHG air pollutants it seeks to regulate.

EPA also refused to consider “whether any harms from the regulated emissions will be independently averted or mitigated.” The agency also ignored emissions reductions that will occur from implementation of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.

EPA's response was filed on Aug. 18, 2011. The agency argued that the administrative record was sufficient, that it reasonably classified six gases on one pollutant, and that it did not need to consider costs, administrative burdens, benefits or mitigation when making its endangerment finding. It also argued that it was not required to submit the proposed finding to the Science Advisory Board for review, and that complaints that it did not do so came too late in the process.

This litigation is one of many suits by the NAM and our coalition partners against EPA's attempt to regulate GHGs. In one, we challenged the agency’s interpretation of the so-called “Johnson Memo,” where EPA stated for the first time that it would apply controls on greenhouse gas emissions on a wide range of manufacturing and other stationary sources. See our summary in NAM v. EPA described as "Challenging EPA's STR interpretation". We subsequently filed additional suits challenging EPA's tailoring rule, tailpipe rule, and other rules being used to regulate stationary sources of greenhouse gases.

On September 26, 2011, the EPA's Inspector General issued a report in part finding that EPA did not make an independent assessment of key scientific evidence that it relied on in issuing its endangerment finding. We then asked the court to take judicial notice of the report. Public documents that are not already in the record of a case may be considered by a court, and we brought this development to the court's attention because it is directly relevant to EPA's claim in court that it exercised independent judgment when reviewing the scientific evidence.

Oral arguments were held on Feb. 28, 2012.

On June 26, 2012, the 3-judge panel upheld all of the primary greenhouse gas regulations. It upheld the EPA’s endangerment finding as within its discretionary power and procedurally sufficient, it upheld the tailpipe rule as being required by law once the endangerment finding is made, it found that the business community lacked standing to challenge the timing and tailoring rules because those rules helped rather than hurt, and, while it found our challenge to earlier rules in 1978, 1980 and 2002 to be timely, it rejected our legal arguments and found EPA’s interpretation compelled by the statute.

On June 1, 2010, the NAM and other business organizations filed suit against EPA's latest interpretation of the so-called “Johnson Memo,” where the Agency stated for the first time that it will apply controls on greenhouse gas emissions on a wide range of manufacturing and other stationary sources beginning on January 2, 2011. This is the second piece of litigation against the EPA, which has issued 4 rules and interpretations that all combine to set limits on stationary sources of greenhouse gas emissions. Manufacturing facilities are among many sources of such emissions, and legal challenges must be filed now even though enforcement against many of these sources will not occur immediately.

This case is related to our challenge to EPA's endangerment finding. See our summary in NAM v. EPA described as "Challenging EPA's endangerment finding".

On Sept. 15, the NAM coalition filed a motion for a partial stay of the regulation of greenhouse gases from stationary sources of emissions. The court denied this motion in December, 2010 and we spent 2011 filing briefs in all the greenhouse cases on the merits. Oral argument was held in the D.C. Circuit on February 29, 2012.

On June 26, 2012, the 3-judge panel upheld all of the primary greenhouse gas regulations. It upheld the EPA’s endangerment finding as within its discretionary power and procedurally sufficient, it upheld the tailpipe rule as being required by law once the endangerment finding is made, it found that the business community lacked standing to challenge the timing and tailoring rules because those rules helped rather than hurt, and, while it found our challenge to earlier rules in 1978, 1980 and 2002 to be timely, it rejected our legal arguments and found EPA’s interpretation compelled by the statute.

On July 6, 2010, the NAM and 15 other business associations filed a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit challenging the EPA's final regulation of light-duty motor vehicles, also known as the Section 202 motor vehicle rule or the tailpipe rule. EPA has announced that this rule, which regulates greenhouse gases from certain motor vehicles, was effective on January 2, 2011. The rule thus established the first EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, and the agency previously announced that once a pollutant is regulated, the usual permit requirements of the PSD program (Prevention of Significant Deterioration) kick in. As a result of this combination of interpretations, EPA has begun to regulate stationary sources of greenhouse gas emissions such as manufacturing facilities around the country.

Our lawsuit was the third in a series of suits challenging four EPA rules that together implement the greenhouse gas regulatory program. Our fundamental concern was over EPA's decision to automatically trigger PSD regulation of all stationary sources.

On Sept. 15, 2010, the NAM coalition filed a motion for a partial stay of the regulation of greenhouse gases from stationary sources of emissions. The court denied this motion in December.

On June 3, 2011, the NAM and 66 other parties filed a combined brief, as required by court order, detailing all the key arguments arising from the motor vehicle rule. Section 202 of the Clean Air Act requires EPA to justify the level of emissions controls imposed by explaining why those controls represent a rational choice in light of the identified endangerment risk. However, EPA said that it had no obligation to show that its regulations would be effective or reduce harm. It failed to justify its interpretation that the light-duty motor vehicle rule triggers stationary source regulations, and failed to address the enormous burdens and costs imposed on stationary sources.

The motor vehicle regulation arises under Title II of the Clean Air Act, while the regulation of stationary sources of emissions is governed by Title I, which focused on local emissions in defined geographical areas causing elevated ground-level exposures to a pollutant. EPA failed to exercise its discretion to limit the scope of the pollutants subject to the Title I, Part C PSD program, as it has done in another context -- the visibility program under the state part of the Clean Air Act.

We also argued that EPA failed to address the “absurd consequences” that the motor vehicle rule produces for stationary sources of greenhouse gas emissions. Had it done so, EPA could have avoided those consequences by adopting a more reasonable interpretation of the Clean Air Act. Instead, it told the regulated community to address the stationary-source consequences of its regulation of greenhouse gases in the tailoring rule proceeding, but then refused to address the stationary source impacts in the tailoring rule, because that rule provided only relief and did not impose costs. This failure to consider the stationary-source impacts violates Section 202 of the Clean Air Act and is inconsistent with multiple mandates from Congress and the President.

The brief itemized several statutes and orders mandating that EPA consider economic effects: (1) Section 317 of the Clean Air Act, which requires an economic impact assessment, (2) the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which requires an analysis of effects on small businesses, (3) the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, which requires an assessment of the impact on state and local governments, (4) the Paperwork Reduction Act, which requires OMB approval for significant information-collection obligations, (5) Executive Order 12898, which requires addressing disproportionate effects on minority and low-income populations, and (6) Executive Order 13211, which requires an assessment of a rule’s impact on energy supply, distribution and use.

The brief also argued that EPA has not demonstrated that the final rule will meaningfully and substantially reduce any endangerment to public health or welfare. It adds virtually no additional benefits to already existing fuel economy standards issued by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA).

Oral arguments were held on February 28, 2012.

On June 26, 2012, the 3-judge panel upheld all of the primary greenhouse gas regulations. It upheld the EPA’s endangerment finding as within its discretionary power and procedurally sufficient, it upheld the tailpipe rule as being required by law once the endangerment finding is made, it found that the business community lacked standing to challenge the timing and tailoring rules because those rules helped rather than hurt, and, while it found our challenge to earlier rules in 1978, 1980 and 2002 to be timely, it rejected our legal arguments and found EPA’s interpretation compelled by the statute.

The NAM and other groups moved to intervene in a law suit brought by the Sierra Club against EPA over the agency's decision to delay the effective date of new regulations on boilers and incinerators. The rules, issued on March 21, 2011, concern major source industrial boilers and commercial and industrial solid waste incinerators. When it published the rules, EPA announced that it would initiate administrative reconsideration of them, and later delayed the effective dates during the reconsideration period. Our intervention in this case was intended to support the EPA's decision to delay implementation.

At the same time, the NAM challenged the boiler MACT and incinerator rules themselves. The rules have the potential to dramatically impact the U.S. economy and impose enormous costs on key industrial sectors, and they force companies to make compliance investment decisions well in advance of their effective dates.

This suit by the Sierra Club was voluntarily dismissed on March 29, 2012. A similar suit brought in federal district court ended when the court invalidated EPA's delay notice.

This suit by Indonesian villagers against ExxonMobil alleges claims under District of Columbia and Delaware law arising from alleged human rights abuses committed by Indonesian forces in the province of Aceh. The judge dismissed the case, based on the general rule that non-resident aliens have no standing to sue in U.S. courts.

The case was appealed to the D.C. Circuit, and the NAM joined with the National Foreign Trade Council, USA*Engage and the U.S. Council for International Business in an amicus brief supporting this result. We argued that federal suits under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), and now state suits under state law, cause irreparable economic harm, interfere with U.S. foreign relations, and impede the policies designed to promote the very democratic and human-rights goals that the plaintiffs purport to advance. Allowing this kind of litigation under a patchwork of different state laws -- for injuries perpetrated against foreign nationals by other foreign nationals in a foreign country -- threatens U.S. economic and political relations. The federal government alone is assigned the constitutional responsibility for foreign relations, and federal law displaces state laws that threaten the effective exercise of the nation's foreign policy. In addition, there is no indication that the state laws at issue here were ever intended to apply to the extraterritorial claims at issue.

Unfortunately, the court ruled 7/8/2011 that aiding-and-abetting liability “is well established under the ATS” and that “the district court erred in ruling that appellants lack prudential standing to bring their non-federal tort claims and in the choice of law determination.” Thus, the case was sent back to the district court for further proceedings.

As part of our continuing efforts to make sure that EPA does not exceed its authority in the regulation of greenhouse gases from stationary sources of emissions, the NAM and 15 other business organizations in our coalition has moved to intervene in a lawsuit brought by an environmental group challenging EPA's power to focus on the largest emitters first. If the environmental group is successful, EPA and various states may be required to apply much more stringent criteria to permitting programs, which could impose enormous costs from foregoing operations or installing emission-control technology. Our motion to intervene does not concede that EPA's decision to regulate greenhouse gases is legally permissible.

The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) sought a court order holding this case in abeyance pending resolution of other challenges to the tailoring rule, but the court rejected that request on June 15, 2011. The next day, CBD voluntarily moved to dismiss this case.

The NAM and other organizations have also filed a separate petition to review the EPA's tailoring rule. For a complete listing of NAM cases against EPA, click here.

On January 5, 2010, EPA published guidance to the states that allowed them to waive fees under Section 185 of the Clean Air Act relating to compliance with ozone emissions regulations. The guidance assisted states in preparing their own State Implementation Plans. It allowed states to either use the Section 185 fee program or "an equivalent alternative program" that is "consistent with the principles of section 172(e)" of the Clean Air Act.

NRDC sued EPA in March to argue that EPA's action allowing an equivalent, alternative program was arbitrary and capricious, and that allowing fee waivers if an ozone nonattainment area meets an 8-hour testing standard instead of a 1-hour standard was also improper. An 8-hour standard is more protective of the environment than a 1-hour standard.

In April, the NAM and 4 other business groups moved to intervene in this suit in support of EPA. That motion was granted. The case affects fees that were then set at $8,766 per ton of volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxides emitted above a baseline amount from major stationary sources within areas of the country that are classified as severe or extreme nonattainment areas.

The NAM and other intervenors filed a brief on Jan. 31, 2011, arguing that EPA's interpretation is reasonable and consistent with congressional intent. It is important that states have the flexibility to design equivalent alternative programs that do not unfairly and inappropriately penalize well-controlled major stationary sources of ozone. Companies that have already dramatically reduced ozone emissions are unable to make further reductions without a harmful drop in productivity, and states should be able to develop alternative programs that focus on sources that are better able to achieve further reductions.

On July 1, the court rejected EPA's arguments that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that the Guidance did not qualify as final agency action, and the plaintiffs' claims were unripe for judicial review. It then ruled that the Guidance qualified as a legislative rule that EPA was required to issue through notice-and-comment rulemaking, and that one of its features -- the "attainment alternative" -- violated the plain language of the Clean Air Act. The court vacated the EPA's guidance and ruled that it could not offer an alternative that allows violations of the old 1-hour standard to continue. The law does not allow EPA to retreat from requirements it sets that prove to be too stringent and unnecessary to protect public health, and EPA must go back to Congress if it wants to do so.

The NAM is part of the SSM Coalition, named for EPA's new Clean Air Act regulations governing special circumstances often present during startup, shutdown or malfunction (SSM) of process equipment or pollution control equipment. On Jan. 4, 2011, the Coalition moved to file an amicus brief in litigation brought by the Portland Cement Association which challenges 2 EPA regulations governing Portland Cement plants. Our particular interest is the rule which establishes national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAPs) under Section 112 of the Act.

EPA's new approach to establishing NESHAPs and its novel interpretations of Section 112 apply not only to the portland cement case, but it plans to adopt similar requirements for a variety of other sectors, including chemical plants, pulp and paper mills, steel pickling operations and wood furniture manufacturing.

The court granted permission to file an amicus brief, and we did so on May 23, 2011. The brief argued that EPA's MACT standard cannot be met by any existing facility and that EPA's standard does not satisfy the statutory requirement that it be achievable.

We also argued that EPA did not justify its decision to no longer recognize the special circumstances that arise during equipment malfunctions. Reasonable performance standards should recognize that sudden, unexpected failures of a manufacturing process or pollution control technology are not part of a source's normal operating mode, and should not be subject to harsh EPA penalties when they occur. EPA could have considered alternatives, such as work practice standards, that would address deviations from normally achievable emissions standards that may occur during periods of malfunction.

Finally, we argued that EPA should have recognized that differences in the source of raw materials makes compliance with a uniform national MACT standard difficult or impossible. It was arbitrary and capricious for EPA fail to make allowances for emissions based on the sources of supply.

On Dec. 9, 2011, the court remanded the NESHAP rule to EPA for reconsideration, but rejected all other issues that challenged EPA's actions.

When EPA determines that an environmental cleanup is required at a contaminated site, it has three options: (1) conduct the cleanup itself and file suit to recover the costs, (2) get a court order, or (3) issue a Unilateral Administrative Order (UAO) compelling a potentially responsible party to undertake a specified action. This case involves the constitutionality of UAOs, which are issued without any right to a hearing prior to their issuance.

The NAM filed an amicus brief supporting GE in this case, arguing that such orders constitute immediate and substantial deprivations of property without any opportunity for a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decision-maker. The lower court improperly found that the cost to EPA of providing a hearing to be substantial (if all UAOs are challenged), but the court did not consider the cumulative effect of UAOs on business in the balance. We also questioned the court's ruling that constitutional rights are less where the company has not shown that EPA's administrative procedure result in an unacceptable rate of error. We argued that no case requires a company to show that an agency has erred on the merits of a case in order to establish a due process violation. Furthermore, many potential defendants do not have substantial resources to reallocate from job creation, product development or other productive uses in order to vindicate their constitutional rights.

On June 29, 2010, the court affirmed the lower court's ruling, finding that manufacturers have the option of refusing to comply with a UAO, thus forcing the EPA to go to court to enforce the order. It also did not feel that the losses experienced by a company subjected to potentially improper UAOs (stock declines, loss of brand value or increasing costs of financing) were enough to constitute violations of due process.

Specifically, it ruled that a company that refuses to comply with a UAO has several safeguards under the law: a court must find (1) that the UAO was proper, (2) that the company "willfully" failed to comply "without sufficient cause," and (3) that, in the court's discretion, fines and treble damages are appropriate. The company has protections if it reasonably believes the UAO is improper.

On December 12, 2008, OSHA published a rule that adopted or amended 34 workplace standards and permitted OSHA to obtain multiple penalties against an employer for providing incorrect personal protective equipment (PPE), no PPE, or incorrect training to employees. The new principle adopted in the rule is that the penalty is to be assessed for each employee, rather than based on the single decision or failure by the employer to use the proper training or PPE for all employees or a group of employees. The rule applies even when the violation is minor, not willful, and causes no harm or injury to employees. A $7,000 penalty for a “serious” violation, for example, could now become a $700,000 penalty if 100 employees are potentially affected, and OSHA could expand the per-employee penalty rule to other cases, not just PPE or training cases.

The NAM, the National Association of Home Builders, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce joined together in a lawsuit challenging this rule in the D.C. Circuit. We opposed the rule because we believed that Congress did not give OSHA the power to address penalty issues in its standards. Whether “per employee” penalties may be assessed is a question committed solely to the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, which may impose penalties on a “per employee” basis when they are warranted on the facts of a specific case. The suit did not challenge OSHA's requirements for training each employee or equipping each with personal protective equipment.

Our briefs argued that Congress did not delegate authority to OSHA to word a standard to change or affect a unit of violation; rather, Congress committed this authority to the OSH Review Commission and the courts.

On April 16, 2010, the D.C. Circuit upheld OSHA's rules. It found that OSHA "stands in the shoes of the legislature" and can both define what constitutes a violation and define the unit of prosecution, or how many times a company can be fined for a single decision that affects many employees.

The decision will result in substantially greater fines and settlement leverage against companies that are alleged to have violated OSHA rules. Although OSHA's Field Operations Manual tells inspectors to issue multiple citations only when the employer's behavior is willful and egregious, the decision gives great discretion to the agency to change its practice in the future.

The NAM is part of the Fine Particulate Matter Petitioners Group, which filed a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit of a final EPA regulation published in October, 2006, entitled "National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter." This case involves stringent new EPA air quality standards, which industry and agricultural groups say go too far and environmental groups and states say are not strict enough.

The regulation applies both to fine particles (generally smaller than 2.5 micrometers in diameter) and to larger particles (less than 10 micrometers). It retains an annual fine particle standard of 15 micrograms per cubic meter, and ratchets down the daily standard from 65 to 35 micrograms per cubic meter. It retains the 150 micrograms level for daily exposure to larger particles. The agriculture and mining industries are not exempt.

The new standard is expected to increase the number of nonattainment areas around the country significantly. Our challenge focused primarily on the fine particle portion of the rule.

Also included in the Fine Particulate Matter Petitioners Group are the American Coke & Coal Chemicals Institute, the American Forest & Paper Association, the American Iron & Steel Institute, the Chamber of Commerce, the Corn Refiners Association, the National Cotton Council of America, the National Oilseed Processors Association and the Portland Cement Association. Our petition was consolidated with others from the American Lung Association and other environmental groups, the National Mining Association, the National Cattlemen's Beef Association, 13 states, the Agricultural Retailers Association, the Utility Air Regulatory Group and others.

On Jan. 29, 2008, we filed a brief supporting EPA's decision to keep the fine particulate matter standard at 15 micrograms per cubic meter. It properly kept the limit at 15 because the risk attributed to that level of ambient exposure has stayed the same or decreased since EPA established that standard in 1997. EPA also properly set the secondary fine particulate matter standard at a level identical to the primary standards, providing increased visibility protection and providing the requisite level of public welfare protection.

We opposed a challenge to the standard that argued the EPA should have adopted recommendations of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC), because the Clean Air Act only allows that group to recommend revisions and the ultimate decision is in the discretion of the EPA Administrator.

On Feb. 24, 2009, the D.C. Circuit remanded the fine particulate standard to the EPA, as well as the EPA's decision to equate the primary and secondary fine particle standards, but upheld the coarse particulate standard. The court ruled that "the EPA did not adequately explain why an annual level of 15 μg/m3 is sufficient to protect the public health while providing an adequate margin of safety from short-term exposures and from morbidity affecting vulnerable subpopulations." It noted in particular three short-term studies that the EPA did not adequately explain away. During the remand, EPA's rule will remain in effect. It also found that EPA acted unlawfully when it failed to determine what level of visibility protection was needed to protect the public welfare. EPA's failure to set a target level of visibility was fatal to the standard it set.

With respect to an industry challenge to the regulation of coarse particulate matter, the court said that EPA need not wait for conclusive evidence of adverse health effects before regulating. It rejected the challenge and upheld this portion of EPA's regulation.

See link below for history of this case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

The NAM appealed the district court's ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. We asked for and received an order from the D.C. Circuit to expedite its review of our challenge, as new and different reports are required at the end of each calendar quarter.

The NAM emphasized that review by the court of appeals is de novo, meaning the court should not give any deference to the district judge's ruling. Our argument focused on the heavy burden the government bears in trying to justify the constitutionality of a statute that infringes upon First Amendment rights. Courts give such restrictive statutes strict scrutiny, and the government's justification for imposing a limitation on speech must be compelling. In addition, the statute must be narrowly crafted and must effectively advance the interest it purports to, but the government has not met this burden. The statute is also unconstitutionally vague, both in its requirement that associations divine the intent of its members who participate, and in its requirement that associations determine what constitutes active participation sufficient to trigger reporting.

An amicus brief in support of the NAM was filed by Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, the WMC Issues Mobilization Council, the Iowa Association of Business and Industry, and the National Paint & Coatings Association. These groups argued that organizations have a First Amendment right to engage in advocacy and political speech, and that Wisconsin businesses have been threatened with retaliation when their identities are disclosed. The threat of peril from the disclosure of association membership is real, and "no one should assume that politically unpopular opinions can be expressed without triggering reprisal, particularly when those expressing controversial opinions are in the public spotlight through compulsory disclosure laws." The brief suggested that disfavored speech is increasingly met "not only with an opposing viewpoint but also efforts to intimidate the organization sponsoring the disfavored speech."

Actual examples were cited, and include political blacklisting, demands for financial support from public officials, and economic retaliation. Wisconsin businesses have been threatened with boycotts after a policy campaign by the WMC Issues Mobilization Council involving the public positions and actions of individual candidates for the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Members were subjected to anonymous telephone harassment and various boycotts were threatened and implemented. Ironically, some of the groups that oppose business issue advocacy are funded by an anonymous group of contributors who, understandably, choose not to identify themselves, and who are not required to be disclosed if they engage in substantial lobbying at the federal level. Anonymous support of public debate from a variety of diverse voices has been consistently protected by the Supreme Court, in part to protect such supporters from public hostility and economic reprisal.

The NAM's reply brief offered strong arguments against the defenses raised by the government defendants.

On Sept. 8, 2009, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision upholding Section 207 of the statute. It ruled that there is a "vital national interest" in knowing who is putting up the money to engage in lobbying, in that Congress needs to evaluate pressures and protect itself. However, the Harriss ruling on which the court relied was a very narrow ruling with respect to disclosure of activities relating to direct lobbying of members of Congress, not an expansive ruling allowing a wide-ranging inquiry into the organizations that participate through their trade associations in background, research, preparation or coordination of lobbying by that organization’s own registered lobbyists.

The court also found that the justification for this law (to disclose contributors to "stealth coalitions") was not dispositive in the constitutional analysis, because the law applies more broadly than that. It deferred to Congress on the justification for the law ("good government requires greater transparency"), relying on the Harriss case but not providing any further rationale.

The court also approved of the law even though it is not the best fit for its purposes, and found that it is acceptable because it is less restrictive than regulating lobbying directly. It did not give much weight to the fears of companies that have been harassed and boycotted for being members of a trade association, and thought that the statute was clear enough with respect to the meaning of "actively participates." After all, only civil fines apply (up to $200,000), unless the government can prove that violations are committed "knowingly and corruptly."

The NAM is disappointed in the outcome and will continue to work to protect the confidentiality of organizations that participate in our lobbying activities.

The NAM and the Washington Legal Foundation filed a joint brief on 8/17/07, urging the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to reverse a lower court ruling. Having failed to impose sweeping regulation on the tobacco industry through regulatory and legislative processes, the federal government took the litigation route, suing Philip Morris under RICO’s civil injunction provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a). The government argued that tobacco companies ran an association-in-fact enterprise over the past half century to operate criminal racketeering schemes of fraud, consisting primarily of allegedly fraudulent statements about the nature of cigarettes.

Our brief argued that many of the allegedly offending statements, found in press releases, public statements, newspaper articles, academic literature and television appearances, addressed matters of public concern and thus fell squarely within the definition of fully protected speech under the First Amendment. We wanted to ensure that the federal government could not punish fully protected speech without proof that allegedly false statements were made with specific intent and were material to consumers.

We also argued that the statements at issue were not commercial speech, which might enjoy less protection, because they did not propose the sale of a product or any other commercial transaction.

By focusing on the speaker (a business) instead of the content of the speech (statements addressing matters of public concern), the district court wrongly viewed the speech as commercial. Such a view will have a chilling effect on public debate of important issues, as all speech made by corporations will be presumptively commercial and enjoy less First Amendment protection from liability.

On 5/22/2009, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the trial court offered comprehensive findings that were sufficient to identify fraudulent acts, that there was sufficient evidence supporting inferences that company executives intended to mislead, and that this specific intent by the executives can be imputed to the corporation to prove liability. The 3-judge panel dismissed the argument about protected speech, saying that the First Amendment does not protect fraud.

The court agreed with the trial court that there was a reasonable likelihood that the defendants would commit future RICO violations, and upheld the order calling for corrective statements. It held that generic discussions about cigarettes, without naming specific brands, still constitutes commercial speech that may be regulated, and that mandated corrective statements can be narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial governmental interest.

The NAM is a member of the CO₂ Litigation Group, which was an intervenor helping to defend EPA in this case. Massachusetts sought a court mandate to force EPA to determine that carbon dioxide is an air pollutant that contributes to air pollution "which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."

We filed a brief 5/15/08 arguing that no such finding is required by the statute unless EPA decides to establish emission standards for new motor vehicles, nor is there any deadline for making such a determination. No clear statutory rights are being harmed by any delay by EPA, and EPA has announced an intention to begin a rulemaking later this spring anyway.

We argued that EPA must be able to consider this proposed rulemaking in the larger context of other regulatory obligations with respect to fuels used in motor vehicles and nonroad engines, as well as new or modified major stationary sources of emissions, comprising perhaps thousands of new facilities not currently subject to stringent Clean Air Act permit requirements.

Climate change from carbon dioxide must be addressed in a comprehensive way with input from the public through the legislative and regulatory processes, not through a judicial directive that truncates public debate.

On June 26, the court denied Massachusetts' petition without opinion, except for a statement by Judge Tatel concurring in part and dissenting in part. He would hold on to the case until EPA gives greater indication that it is moving forward with the regulation. The EPA announced in March that it would issue an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking sometime in the future.

On March 5, 2007, the NAM joined with other business groups to urge a federal court to reject an attempt by the AFL-CIO to force OSHA to issue a new regulation that would require employers to pay for nearly all personal protective equipment (PPE) on the job. While many companies already pay for safety equipment, new OSHA rules would establish another regulatory and litigation labyrinth for those and other employers to navigate. OSHA has the authority to require safe working conditions, but our brief argues that the agency does not have the authority to issue an economic regulation that transfers costs and that interferes with collective bargaining. Who pays for safety equipment is irrelevant to whether the employer is providing a safe workplace.

In a related development, on March 6, Rep. Roybal-Allard (D-) introduced H.R. 1327, called the Protective Equipment for America’s Workers Act, which would require that OSHA issue essentially the 1999 version of a proposed rule within 30-days of enactment.

On March 14, the Secretary of Labor told the court that she would publish a final PPE payment rule in November 2007, and moved the court to hold the case in abeyance pending that action. The AFL-CIO promptly supported the Secretary's motion, and the Court agreed.

In our amicus brief, we argued that even if OSHA does have the authority to issue a regulation, it had the discretion to tackle much more significant safety issues on its regulatory agenda first. The proposed rule would have a serious negative impact on all employers.

On 11/15/07, OSHA published a final PPE payment rule, 29 CFR 1910.132, which requires employers to provide certain personal protective equipment at no cost to employees.

The NAM and 3 other associations filed a petition for review 3/31/06 challenging an OSHA regulation that recognizes “threshold limit values” (TLVs) for certain hazardous substances in the workplace.  Our dispute centered on the fact that OSHA's regulation adopts the TLVs automatically, without providing the public, including the manufacturing sector, an opportunity to comment on them.  OSHA relied on standards developed by a private organization, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), which periodically updates its list of TLVs.

Early in 2006, OSHA incorporated by reference these new values into its hazard communication standard, applicable to manufacturers nationwide.  New numbers for carbon disulfide, iron oxide, propylene, crystalline silica and other substances are now in effect, and OSHA can issue citations when companies fail to incorporate these numbers into material safety data sheets in the workplace, even though the numbers have never been reviewed or offered for public comment by OSHA.

The NAM joined together with American Composites Manufacturers Association, Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. and the Portland Cement Association in the petition. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has also intervened in the case.

The Secretary of Labor moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that challenges to regulations like the Hazard Communication Standard must be made within 60 days of the date on which the standard was promulgated, in this case many years ago. We countered that by incorporating new requirements by reference, the OSHA regulation does constitute a new regulation each time that ACGIH changes its TLVs.

On May 11, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the NAM's lawsuit, saying that it should have been filed in 1983 when the HazComm standard was promulgated. It ruled that because employers still have to comply with the same HazComm rule, the rule has not changed and there can be no lawsuit challenging it. The court made this decision recognizing that new TLVs impose new obligations on employers, and that employers have no choice but to treat substances on the list as hazardous.

The NAM is very surprised and concerned about this ruling. It allows OSHA to regulate by proxy, turning over the decision on whether substances are hazardous to an outside organization that does not operate with the procedural and legal constraints that apply to all federal regulatory decisions. Whether a substance is hazardous is now in the hands of a group that has no obligations to Congress, the regulated community or the public at large. This kind of third-party regulation without any procedural or substantive restraints could become a surreptitious way for OSHA or other regulatory agencies to avoid statutory requirements for fairness.

The NAM, the American Chemistry Council, the American Forest and Paper Association and the American Petroleum Institute filed joint motions to intervene to help defend the EPA against two suits brought by the ALA and 3 environmental groups over some of its Clean Air Act rules. The rules relate to issues that were reconsidered by the EPA as a result of earlier litigation, and are entitled, “Nonattainment Major New Source Review Implementation Under 8-Hour Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard: Reconsideration,” and “Implementation of the 8-Hour Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard – Phase 1: Reconsideration.”

Industry supports the new rules because they provide reasonable answers to questions relating to the implementation of tougher clean air requirements. First, since the old system of measuring emissions has been revoked, the new rules do not mandate certain contingency measures if an area of the country does not meet those old standards. Second, even though the old standard has been revoked, portions of it remain in place and there are new ways to demonstrate compliance with the standard. Third, new source review permitting requirements will be triggered based on the new 8-hour standard, which generally will apply to fewer facilities.

For further details, see South Coast Air Quality Management District v. EPA.

The NAM is a member of the Equipment Replacement Rule Coalition, which filed a brief 12/9/05 in a suit brought by the State of New York against the EPA over the agency's 10/27/03 final rule titled "Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Non-Attainment New Source Review (NSR): Equipment Replacement Provision of the Routine Maintenance, Repair and Replacement Exclusion." This rule governs the factors that determine whether companies must obtain EPA permits before replacing broken or deteriorating equipment at their industrial facilities. New York challenged the rule as too lenient. The Equipment Replacement Rule Coalition, comprising various trade associations, manufacturers and utilities, generally support the EPA's new rule.

Our brief on the merits argued that EPA has discretion under the Clean Air Act to issue the rule, and that major modifications are not any physical plant changes, but only those that increase an existing unit’s design capacity to emit.

On 3/17/06, the Court vacated the rule. It decided that the Clean Air Act’s permit requirements for “any physical change” do not allow the EPA to expand the category of projects that it views as “routine replacement.” The only exceptions are projects that do not result in emissions increases or that are de minimis. The decision leaves the existing Routine Maintenance, Repair and Replacement Exclusion in place.

The NAM is part of a joint industry effort to support the Environmental Protection Agency’s 8-Hour Ozone Phase I Implementation Rule. Since enactment of the Clean Air Act in 1990, EPA has been working to implement provisions that establish ozone control requirements and deadlines for compliance. First it established a standard based on a 1-hour measurement system, with 5 classifications of violations (marginal, moderate, serious, severe or extreme). In 1997, EPA replaced the 1-hour standard with a more stringent standard with an 8-hour averaging time, and, after court challenges that went to the Supreme Court, again modified the regulation to provide different compliance timetables depending on the levels of ozone in a particular area.

The State of Ohio sued to delay the 8-hour standard and to force EPA to adopt more reasonable deadlines. It feared that implementation will require the “depopulation strategy,” whereby all local industry must shut down and all local vehicle traffic must be stopped in the Cleveland-Akron area. The Baton Rouge Chamber of Commerce sued to eliminate enforcement under the old 1-hour standard. The American Lung Association, the Natural Resources Defense Council and others, sued to force the use of specific timetables for implementation and to prevent companies from backsliding from the old standard. The NAM and other industry groups intervened in these suits to generally support the EPA’s latest efforts.

Our brief argued that the EPA’s balance of compliance requirements involving either the old 1-hour standard or the tougher 8-hour standard is valid. Nothing in the Clean Air Act requires old standards to remain in effect in perpetuity. Since the old standard was revoked, penalties should not continue to be assessed under that system. We supported EPA’s determination that an area subject to the 8-hour measuring standard should be subject only that the new classification system that goes with it.

On December 22, 2006, the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule and remanded the matter to EPA for further proceedings. The court upheld EPA's decision to revoke the 1-hour ozone standard, but imposed substantial restraints. It struck down EPA's decision classifying nonattainment areas under the generally less demanding Subpart 1 (of Part D of Title I), instead ruling that areas with 8-hour "design values" (the measured concentration of ground-level ozone) above .09 ppm must be classified under Subpart 2. It called EPA's decision to apply only Subpart 1 requirements to areas with 8-hour design values between .08 ppm and .09 ppm unreasonable. In addition, EPA's rules were designed to prevent "backsliding" by regulated industries, and the D.C. Circuit ruled that several requirements continue to apply (such as New Source Review requirements, section 185 emission fees, contingency plans for failure to improve, and local transportation planning restraints).

Until further word from EPA, the new 8-hour designation/classification system was vacated, but the designations/classifications themselves were in a separate rule that was not vacated. Thus, those designations and classifications apparently remain in effect, with State Implementation Plans due in June. In addition, the anti-backsliding provisions under the 1-hour rule are still in effect.

On March 22, 2007, the NAM joined with other organizations in a petition for rehearing. We argued that the court's decision expands EPA's Section 172(e) authority to prevent companies from backsliding on ozone pollution limits. We argued that the backsliding provision applies only if air quality standards are relaxed, and the EPA in fact issued revised standards that are more stringent. In addition, existing case precedent requires that courts defer to EPA interpretations that are reasonable. The court's decision second-guessed the EPA's interpretation, and conflicts with that of another federal appeals court. The petition for rehearing was denied 6/8/2007.

These cases were filed in 2003 by 12 states and various environmental and other organizations to force the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons) from new motor vehicles as pollutants. The EPA and 10 other states opposed the suits, and the CO2 Litigation Group, of which the NAM is a member, intervened. On 7/15/05, the D.C. Circuit issued a splintered decision allowing the EPA to continue to decline to regulate greenhouse gases. Judge Randolph ruled that the EPA had discretion and a scientific justification not to regulate greenhouse gases, and, although Judge Sentelle refused to reach this issue, he ruled that the petitioners did not have standing to bring the case. Thus, the EPA’s decision stands. Judge Tatel dissented, arguing that the EPA does have the authority and has failed to give an adequate explanation for not regulating greenhouse gases. Whether the EPA is mandated by statute to regulate greenhouse gases is unresolved. It has declined to do so at this point. The NAM does not believe the EPA has this authority, nor is there sufficient evidence that emissions of greenhouse gases from domestic automobiles endanger public health or welfare.

The NAM is one member of a coalition of associations known as the NSR Manufacturers Roundtable which filed a motion 1/15/03 to intervene in a suit brought by NY, CT, ME, MD, MA, NH, NJ, RI and VT against the EPA's final regulation governing the procedures for companies to install stringent emission controls at their facilities under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review (NSR) provisions of the Clean Air Act. These states challenged the legality of EPA's rule, and the NSR Manufacturers Roundtable intervened to insure that the court considers the views of manufacturers and the effects of the rule on industry. The Roundtable includes the Alliance of Automobile Mfrs., the American Chemistry Council, the American Forest & Paper Assn., the American Iron and Steel Institute, American Petroleum Institute, the Council of Industrial Boiler Owners, National Mining Assn., the National Petrochemical & Refiners Assn., the Portland Cement Assn. and the NAM.

The NSR Manufacturers Roundtable’s first brief (filed 5/11/04) challenged EPA language in the rule’s preamble and argued that the statutory language, as well as the history of its enforcement, makes clear that the first step of the analysis of whether there is a change to an existing emissions unit at a stationary source is the requirement that the emitting capacity of the existing unit must be increased (i.e., that “new pollution” be created) by the change.

An 8/30/04 brief supported the EPA’s methodology for determining whether annual emissions have significantly increased.

The D.C. Circuit issued a mixed ruling on 6/24/05. It upheld some of the EPA’s decisions, vacated others, and rejected as not ripe industry’s challenge to the rule’s preamble language on the “actual-to-potential” methodology. The court’s main rulings are:

The NAM and the U.S. Chamber filed a joint brief on 8/3/04 in this $280 billion government suit against the tobacco industry opposing the theory that disgorgement is a remedy available under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Such a claim improperly avoids the procedural safeguards in the criminal forfeiture provisions of RICO and conflicts with precedent under comparable provisions of another statute on which it was patterned -- the Clayton Act. We do not believe RICO was intended to provide disgorgement of profits as a remedy. The government is trying to do an end-run around the strict procedural requirements under RICO when it attempts to seize assets alleged to be the ill-gotten gains of racketeering activity.

On 2/4/05, the D.C. Circuit ruled that disgorgement is not a remedy in civil suits under RICO. The law is limited to forward-looking remedies that are aimed at future violations. These include divestment, injunctions and dissolution, but not disgorgement of past gains.

To receive permission to export products that have dual uses – i.e., both commercial and military – manufacturers must supply the federal government with confidential information about the transactions. The plaintiffs in this case sought information from more than 10,000 applications under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), claiming that a significant lapse in the Export Administration Act could not be fixed by statutory language retroactively extending the date when the EAA was in effect.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in this case on July 26, 2002, urging the court to affirm a ruling that validated the FOIA exemption protecting the confidentiality of dual-use export license applications. Ultimately, the court ruled that the exemption was still valid even though the Export Administration Act had technically lapsed, since Congress intended its protections to remain in force under other authorities.

This litigation by the NAM and other business groups against the EPA went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2001 (see Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.) . The Court remanded it to the D.C. Circuit for further proceedings regarding the validity of EPA's standard for ozone and particulate matter. On 3/26/02, the D.C. Circuit found that the EPA's 1997 NAAQS rules for PM2.5 and ozone are neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Court denied petitions for review except to the extent the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision and the D.C .Circuit’s 1999 decisions require further action by the EPA.

The D.C. Circuit began by pointing out that its earlier decisions addressed only whether the Clean Air Act (or the EPA’s reading of the CAA) adequately limits the EPA’s discretion. However, the 3/26 decision involves whether the EPA reasonably exercised its discretion under the CAA. The Court found that the agency was not arbitrary and capricious in promulgating either rule.

With respect to PM2.5, the Court said that the EPA need not “identify perfectly safe levels of pollutants” and need not “definitively identify pollutant levels below which risks to public health are negligible.” Importantly, the Court also rejected environmental groups’ challenges to the PM2.5 standard as insufficiently stringent.

On ozone, the Court found that the EPA had a basis for its conclusion that the existing one-hour standard was inadequate. Based on the rulemaking docket, the Court concluded that the EPA’s choice of the 0.08 parts per million level was not arbitrary and capricious. Earlier holdings that the 8-hour ozone implementation policy is unlawful and that the EPA must consider evidence of ground-level ozone’s beneficial effects are left undisturbed by this ruling.

The NAM and 12 other organizations sued the EPA on March 17, 2000. Its petition for review challenged the EPA's interim guidance on the definition of federally permitted releases for air emissions. As a result of the suit, the EPA suspended the Interim Guidance on 5/19/00 in a motion to the court.

On 4/17/02 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published its "Guidance on the CERCLA Section 101(10)(H) Federally Permitted Release Definition for Certain Air Emissions." This guidance supersedes the December 17, 1999 Interim Guidance, which is now deemed to be withdrawn. The NAM praised the new guidance in a press release.

The new guidance clarifies the discussion of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and particulate matter (PM) limits and controls and when releases of hazardous substances which are constituents of these pollutants could qualify for the FPR exemption under CERCLA [Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act] and EPCRA [Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act]. The Guidance also adds a section addressing nitrogen oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2). The guidance also discusses certain releases from minor sources and announces a forthcoming guidance document that addresses grandfathered sources.

The lawsuit was dismissed voluntarily.

The D.C. Circuit ruled 4/27/01 that the federal district court improperly failed to grant an FTC motion for a preliminary injunction against the Heinz/Beech-Nut merger in the baby-food industry. It ruled that the equities favor the status quo until the case can be fully tried, and that the FTC showed a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, given the concentration in the market and the high barriers to entry. It rejected rebuttal arguments about a lack of competition between the companies, the extent to which the merger would enhance efficiencies, the need for innovation, and the existence of structural barriers to collusion.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in this case on 12/29/00, supporting the merger of Heinz and Beech-Nut. The companies are the second and the third largest manufacturers in the jarred baby food industry respectively, behind industry leader Gerber.

The district court denied the Federal Trade Commission’s ("FTC") request for a preliminary injunction of the merger, even though it found that the resulting high market concentration could amount to a prima facie case under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers that substantially lessen competition. The concern was rebutted by the potential for merger-related efficiency gains that could allow the newly combined entity to more effectively compete with Gerber, leading to more intense competition, not less. Thus, the merger was more like a shift from one to two companies competing in the industry, rather than from three to two.

The FTC appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that high market concentration, combined with steep barriers to entry and lack of a failing firm, is dispositive for purposes of a preliminary injunction, regardless of other factors. Heinz and Beech-Nut countered that the totality of the circumstances should be evaluated, including market realities such as efficiency gains. The NAM supported the latter position, as merger-related efficiencies can have a positive economic impact by enabling manufacturers to improve existing product offerings and introduce innovative and higher-quality products at competitive prices.

On 11/2/01, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the NLRB acts legally when it requires that employees in non-union workplaces be given the right to have a co-worker or other individual with them during an investigatory interview by an employer. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act protects the right of an employee to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection, and having a co-worker present during an investigatory interview is justifiable to ensure that the employer "does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment unjustly." However, the court refused to apply the NLRB's revised interpretation retroactively in this case. It will be applied in future cases.

The NAM and other groups filed an amicus brief on 5/15/01 objecting to the extension of so-called Weingarten rights of union employees to non-union workers, arguing that an individual non-union employee's representative does not represent the interests of the entire workplace.

The NAM joined in an amicus brief urging the D.C. Circuit to reverse a recent 2 to 1 NLRB ruling. The ruling required the new owner of a company to bargain with the union that represented the employees of the company before it was sold, in spite of the fact that a majority of the employees signed a petition to decertify the union as their representative. The decision undermines employee freedom of choice, forcing upon them an artificial and unwanted relationship which could give rise to industrial strife and tension. The NAM, joining with the Master Printers of America, the Center on National Labor Policy, Inc., and Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., argues that the National Labor Relations Act gives an employer the right not to recognize a union when it has a good faith doubt that the union represents a majority of its employees.

In November, 2000, OSHA released its final regulation on ergonomics. This oppressive and unreasonable rule was pushed through to completion with unprecedented speed and with considerable changes from the proposed to the final versions. Large number of manufacturers were alarmed, and the NAM took action, suing the agency for acting outside its authority and outside the procedures required for such a drastic regulation. In cooperation with the National Coalition on Ergonomics, the NAM led an industry-wide effort to coordinate the legal effort in court, and a subsequent legislative effort in Congress.

Soon after the NAM filed a lengthy statement of legal issues in court, Congress stepped in to overturn the regulation by passing a joint resolution of disapproval, which, on March 20, 2001, was signed by President Bush. OSHA is prohibited from implementing the regulation, and may not issue one in substantially the same form without congressional authorization. The litigation was subsequently dismissed as moot.

The NAM filed suit against the EPA 4/10/98 arguing that an EPA rule improperly granted Indian tribes authority to act under the Clean Air Act. On 5/5/00, the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s 2/2/98 Final Air Quality Planning and Management Rule for Indian Tribes ("Rule"). In April, 2001, the Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal.

The Rule provides that the EPA will delegate to any federally recognized Indian Tribe, upon receipt of a properly completed tribal application, authority to implement federal Clean Air Act ("CAA") programs over lands located within the exterior boundaries of what EPA refers to as "Indian Country", as that term relates to a tribe. "Indian Country" thus includes all lands within the boundaries of a traditionally federally recognized Indian reservation (including privately owned, non-Indian lands), lands within the boundaries of off-reservation areas held in trust for a tribe by the federal government, and other lands over which a tribe can demonstrate that it has jurisdiction. Under the Rule, off-reservation "trust lands" include those lands purchased or acquired by a tribe or tribal member and placed into trust--including lands acquired for commercial and gaming casino purposes. The EPA’s definition of Indian Country conflicts with the far more restrictive definition of "reservation" used by Congress, the federal courts and even the EPA in other federal laws, cases and regulations governing tribal affairs.

Pursuant to the Rule, tribes may also "redesignate", as "Class I" areas for air quality management purposes, lands located outside of traditional reservation boundaries. Under current federal law, only lands within such boundaries may be redesignated as Class I. Redesignation to Class I status invokes the most stringent federal air quality protection standards relating to the siting of new or modified manufacturing facilities in areas sometimes located several hundred miles away from the Class I area.

Other features of the Rule include the elimination of the Title V requirement for review in state court of adverse tribal operating permit decisions and permitting delays and the insulation of tribes from citizen suits for asserted violations of the law. Moreover, upon approval of a tribal authority application under the Rule, state air permitting agencies will be stripped of their own authority to issue or renew installation, operation and other air permits to industrial sources located or seeking to locate within Indian Country, and existing state air permits issued to such sources will be invalidated.

Prior to issuance of the Rule, tribes, like states, were required to affirmatively demonstrate the public health, welfare and environmental bases for their assertion of environmental authority over lands that are clearly otherwise within their jurisdiction. That is no longer the case. The Court’s decision now allows the EPA (an administrative agency), in conjunction with tribes, to redraw state boundaries for regulatory purposes and to dispossess state permit holders of substantial rights. The EPA asserts that other federal environmental laws similarly allow EPA to delegate to a tribe authority to regulate other environmental media within "Indian Country".

The Petitioners in the case included, among others, the State of Michigan, several Arizona and New Mexico utility companies, the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Forest and Paper Association, the Michigan Chemical Council, the Rhinelander Area Chamber of Commerce and the Timber Producers Association of Michigan and Wisconsin, Inc. It is their position, among others, that decisions to redraw state boundaries for regulatory purposes must be made within the framework of established federal law and the United States Constitution, with full public participation, and not at the whim of federal administrative agencies. For more information regarding the Rule, contact Brian J. Renaud of Howard & Howard Attorneys, P.C., at (248) 723-0356, counsel in the case for NAM, AF&PA, the Michigan Chemical Council, the Rhinelander Area Chamber of Commerce, Inc. and the Timber Producers Association of Michigan and Wisconsin, Inc. Case decided on 5/5/00.

On 10/15/99, the NAM filed a brief supporting the NLRB’s decision allowing a company to lock out employees who engage in inside-game tactics. The D.C. Circuit ruled 5/9/00 to uphold the company’s lockout.

Union employees use "inside game" tactics to win bargaining-table concessions, slowing down the work pace, refusing to work overtime, asking for minute instructions from supervisors, filing mass charges with government agencies, calling in sick, or otherwise impeding or disrupting operations without actually going on strike. By taking the strike inside, union employees continue to be paid. The company in this case faced this situation and locked them out.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed an NLRB decision in favor of the company, Central Illinois Public Service Co. (CIPSCO). The court and the Board allow companies to lock out such employees, as a legitimate countervailing economic weapon. According to the court, lockouts are not "inherently destructive of employee rights," and the employer had a "legitimate and substantial business justification" for the lockout. A lockout is a reasonable tool to help bring about a resolution of collective bargaining negotiations, and there was no evidence of anti-union animus on the part of the employer.

(consolidated with American Petroleum Institute & NAM v. EPA) -- The NAM filed a brief in March of 1998 calling on the court to review the final rules on the EPA's new air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter, as well as a final EPA rule relating to the "federal reference method" for National Ambient Air Quality Standards. On May 14, 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected these rules implemented by the EPA concerning ozone pollution. This ruling, a victory for manufacturers, was subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed in 2001.

The D.C. Circuit's ruling temporarily stopped the EPA from assuming arbitrary authority. Manufacturers have struggled with EPA standards that are unrealistically strict and not reasonably related to clear health benefits. The ruling required EPA to say why the ozone pollution levels it has set are reasonable in term of health effects

The Court denied in part and granted in part the EPA’s petition for rehearing on Oct. 28, 1999.

The Government petitioned for Supreme Court review, on 1/26/99. The EPA appealed three issues, including whether:

1) the rulemaking process used by the EPA in revising the ozone and PM NAAQS "effects an unconstitutional delegation of authority";

2) the D.C. Circuit erred in assuming it had authority to review as a final agency action EPA’s "preliminary preamble statements on the scope of the agency’s authority to implement the revised ‘eight-hour’ ozone NAAQS;" and

3) subpart 2 of the Clean Air Act (which sets requirements for areas to come into attainment with the one-hour ozone standard) restricts EPA’s authority under other provisions "to implement a new and more protective ozone NAAQS" until the one-hour standard is attained.

EPA did not appeal the D.C. Circuit’s finding that the Agency must consider all health effects, both negative and positive, in setting a standard.

Background: When EPA issued its new air rule for ozone, the agency ignored the advice of its own scientific advisory panel and sidestepped a 1996 law designed to mitigate the costs of major rules on small businesses. These issues are the driving force behind an NAM lawsuit challenging EPA’s new ozone air quality standard. Two NAM briefs filed 3/23/98 ask the Court of Appeals to throw out the rule.

The NAM briefs noted that EPA’s new standard lacks the scientific support called for under the Clean Air Act and could actually lower health protection. The new standard:

Just as bad, EPA ignored its statutory duty to comply with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (P.L. 104-121), which requires agencies to study the potential impacts of major rules on small entities and find ways to mitigate their costs.

On April 9, 1999, the D.C. Circuit ruled that OSHA violated the law by not following proper rulemaking procedures in its implementation of the controversial Cooperative Compliance Program. Many manufacturers felt that OSHA's plan to offer the option of signing up for the CCP or face wall-to-wall inspections effectively forced them into the CCP. The case immediately affected more than 12,000 companies targeted by OSHA for inspection. OSHA's tactic was considered to be back-door rulemaking and could be a way to impose regulatory requirements without going through the legally required rulemaking procedures.

The Government lost its appeal of an award of attorneys' fees to the NAM in this case in which several of the Department of Labor's regulations relating to the H-1B temporary visa program were substantially rejected. On 11/3/98, the court ruled that an association that substantially prevails in a civil action against the United States can collect attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act as long as its net worth does not exceed $7,000,000 and it has no more than 500 employees. The net worth or number of employees of individual members of the association is not counted in this calculation. The Court also ruled that the law firm is eligible for fees even though it handled the case on a pro bono (free) basis. (The firm is also entitled to additional fees for winning the appeal on the fee issue.)

The ruling will encourage trade associations and their outside counsel to litigate important and legitimate challenges to government regulations. The Sixth Circuit, however, takes a contrary position on this issue.

(Also known as Clean Air Implementation Project vs. EPA). The NAM filed this petition 4/18/97 to review a final EPA rule relating to credible evidence. The case affects manufacturers subject to new source performance standards (NSPS) and national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAPs) under the Clean Air Act. The case was dismissed on 8/14/98 as unripe.

The NAM petitioned the D.C. Circuit to review final regulations establishing simplified "Type A" procedures for natural resource damage assessments under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. The procedures rely on complex computer modeling with very little site-specific input, and create a rebuttable presumption against potentially responsible parties, including many NAM members. The NAM argued that the regulations were invalid because (1) liability might be imposed without a showing of actual injury, (2) an assessment includes restoration without considering feasibility or cost-effectiveness, and (3) a restoration model assumes losses that are speculative and hypothetical. The D.C. Circuit court on 1/16/98 rejected the NAM arguments, concluding that the Department of the Interior's interpretation of the relevant CERCLA provisions were entitled to deference and that its damage submodels "suffice."

The D.C. Circuit ruled on June 2, 1998, that IBP did not have enough control over a third-party contractor's work at its meat processing plant to subject IBP to fines under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The NAM filed an amicus brief supporting IBP's argument that OSHA should not cite the company when the contractor's employees engage in activities that violate the OSH Act. Oral argument was held May 1, 1998, and the NAM provided 5 minutes of oral argument as the amicus (this is quite unusual).

The NAM filed a petition for review on 3/6/98 of OSHA's final regulation on respiratory protection. These are new rules, issued 1/8/98, that govern the use of respirators on the job around hazardous materials. NAM member companies met with OSHA 3/16/98 to try to resolve various concerns about language in the final regulation that is either unclear, inconsistent, or violative of privacy protections in other laws. We were also concerned about a new requirement that companies must implement engineering controls as far as feasible to prevent atmospheric contamination. OSHA has approved an enforcement directive that addresses several of the NAM concerns. The case was transferred to the 11th Circuit and consolidated with three other petitions for review, filed by the American Iron and Steel Institute, the American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, and the Battery Council International. The Battery Council withdrew its challenge, and, after OSHA approved its new enforcement directive addressing several NAM concerns, the NAM did likewise. The AISI and ACOEM litigation was rejected.

The NAM filed an amicus brief opposing an expansion of employer liability for companies that share control over certain employees. In this case, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) departed from precedent and imposed new “indirect” control factors into its analysis of CNN’s status as a joint employer, which could challenge traditional business relationships and expose manufacturers to additional liability. The NAM’s brief argued that the new control factors would create a standard that would impose significant burdens and uncertainties in business relationships. In a win for manufacturers, the court noted that the NLRB had not explained how CNN satisfied the traditional “direct and immediate” test for determining joint-employer status and remanded the case.

On 10/15/99, the NAM filed a brief supporting the NLRB’s decision allowing a company to lock out employees who engage in inside-game tactics. The D.C. Circuit ruled 5/9/00 to uphold the company’s lockout.

Union employees use "inside game" tactics to win bargaining-table concessions, slowing down the work pace, refusing to work overtime, asking for minute instructions from supervisors, filing mass charges with government agencies, calling in sick, or otherwise impeding or disrupting operations without actually going on strike. By taking the strike inside, union employees continue to be paid. The company in this case faced this situation and locked them out.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed an NLRB decision in favor of the company, Central Illinois Public Service Co. (CIPSCO). The court and the Board allow companies to lock out such employees, as a legitimate countervailing economic weapon. According to the court, lockouts are not "inherently destructive of employee rights," and the employer had a "legitimate and substantial business justification" for the lockout. A lockout is a reasonable tool to help bring about a resolution of collective bargaining negotiations, and there was no evidence of anti-union animus on the part of the employer.

On 11/2/01, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the NLRB acts legally when it requires that employees in non-union workplaces be given the right to have a co-worker or other individual with them during an investigatory interview by an employer. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act protects the right of an employee to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection, and having a co-worker present during an investigatory interview is justifiable to ensure that the employer "does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment unjustly." However, the court refused to apply the NLRB's revised interpretation retroactively in this case. It will be applied in future cases.

The NAM and other groups filed an amicus brief on 5/15/01 objecting to the extension of so-called Weingarten rights of union employees to non-union workers, arguing that an individual non-union employee's representative does not represent the interests of the entire workplace.

The NAM joined in an amicus brief urging the D.C. Circuit to reverse a recent 2 to 1 NLRB ruling. The ruling required the new owner of a company to bargain with the union that represented the employees of the company before it was sold, in spite of the fact that a majority of the employees signed a petition to decertify the union as their representative. The decision undermines employee freedom of choice, forcing upon them an artificial and unwanted relationship which could give rise to industrial strife and tension. The NAM, joining with the Master Printers of America, the Center on National Labor Policy, Inc., and Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., argues that the National Labor Relations Act gives an employer the right not to recognize a union when it has a good faith doubt that the union represents a majority of its employees.

The NLRB has appealed a decision of a federal judge who ruled that it did not have a quorum when it promulgated its “ambush election” rule in 2011. The Coalition for a Democratic Workplace, of which the NAM is a leading member, challenged the rule. Click here for a summary of the proceedings in the trial court.

The NLRB filed its main brief on Nov. 16, and the Chamber and CDW filed their brief on Dec. 31, 2012. Oral arguments were scheduled before Judges Henderson, Brown and Kavanaugh, but the arguments were postponed and the case was held in abeyance pending resolution of the Noel Canning decision on whether the recess appointments to the Board were constitutional.

In December of 2013, the NLRB voluntarily dismissed its appeal in Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, the case in which the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found the Board’s expedited representation election rule invalid because the Board lacked a quorum when it issued the rule in December 2011.

The NAM has won a major victory for manufacturers that we have been fighting for since 2011. This win came from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, where we appealed a federal court ruling that upheld the NLRB's regulation that required employers to post in their workplaces a notice of the right of employees to organize into unions, bargain collectively, discuss wages, benefits and working conditions, jointly complain, strike and picket, or choose not to do any of these activities. For details on the district court proceedings, click here.

On 5/22/2012, the NAM filed a brief arguing 3 main issues. First, we challenged the fundamental authority of the Board to issue a posting rule at all. Congress never authorized notice-posting requirements, and rejected an express notice-posting amendment in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) while accepting notice-posting requirements in other labor laws.

Second, we again raised the argument that a mandate that private parties post government notices, without a clear statutory basis or compelling governmental interest, violates the First Amendment rights of employers as well as the balance of requirements spelled out in the NLRA.

Third, if the penalties for failing to post the required notice were themselves unlawful, the judge should have thrown out the entire regulation, because the NLRB did not intend for the posting requirement to stand on its own without enforcement teeth. The posting requirement was not severable from the enforcement provisions, and the entire regulation should fall.

We later filed a reply brief arguing that the NLRB failed to establish any statutory authority for the posting requirement. The Board had no authority to impose affirmative duties on employers who are charged with violations of the NLRA. The rule also violated the statutory provision which prohibits the Board from regulating expression that “contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit,” and violated employers’ First Amendment rights by forcing employers to communicate an unwanted editorial judgment to their employees.

On May 7, 2013, the D.C. Circuit agreed and overturned the NLRB regulation. It found that the rule's requirement that employers post a Government message requires an act of speech, and Section 8(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act declares that speech "shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under the provisions of this [Act], if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." Thus the rule itself violates Section 8(c) because it makes an employer's failure to post the Board's notice an unfair labor practice.

It also ruled that the Board could not consider noncompliance with the rule to be evidence of antiunion animus, since that is also an unfair labor practice based on protected speech. Finally, the court ruled that the Board did not have the authority to amend the statute of limitations for filing unfair labor practice charges. Unless Congress intended the statute of limitations to include exceptions, the NLRB cannot create them years after the law was enacted.

Because all three means of enforcing the Board's posting requirement were invalid, the court ruled that the posting requirement itself was invalid, because the NLRB would never have promulgated it in the first place without ways to enforce it. The Board did not want just voluntary compliance.

A concurring opinion from 2 of the 3 judges found that the Board did not have authority under Section 6 of the NLRA to issue the rule because the posting requirement was not necessary to carry out the Board's responsibilities. It may only issue regulations that are necessary to carry out its responsibilities. The law does not impose an obligation on employers to educate its employees on labor relations law. In addition, the NLRB was set up to handle complaints that are filed by others, not promulgate rules that are "so aggressively prophylactic as the posting rule."

On 7/22/13, the NLRB asked the full complement of judges on the D.C. Circuit to rehear this case. The NAM filed a brief in opposition, arguing that the Board failed to identify any conflict between the court's ruling and any other court decision that would warrant further review. We also noted that a majority of the panel that decided the case also ruled that the Board exceeded its statutory authority on other grounds which independently preclude enforcement of the poster rule. On Sept. 4, the court declined to rehear the case. The NLRB had 90 days to appeal to the Supreme Court, but it declined to do so. The D.C. Circuit's ruling is now final.

This case involves an employer who asked employees not to discuss their complaints about co-workers with others while an investigation was ongoing. The NLRB ruled that an employer violates employee union-organizing rights when it has such a blanket policy, and that employers must “first determine whether in any given investigation witnesses need protection, evidence is in danger of being destroyed, testimony is in danger of being fabricated, or there is a need to prevent a cover up.”

The NAM and other business groups submitted an amicus brief in support of the employer, stating that the NLRB was incorrect in its decision because the Board failed to take into account the challenges employers will now face when conducting an investigation. For example, with the Board’s decision an employer may not be able to uncover the entire story because employees will not come forward if they know the investigation is not confidential. Additionally, the amicus brief pointed out the Board ignored its previous decisions on investigations and overturned decades of its own precedent on the matter. The Board’s decision places an enormous burden on employers to justify the confidentiality of their investigations prior to interviewing all the witnesses or even assessing the situation.

The D.C. Circuit sent the case back to the NLRB. In June 2015, the NLRB again ruled the employer’s confidentially policy violated the NLRA, and Banner again appealed to the D.C. Circuit. The NAM also filed an amicus brief in the second appeal.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in a labor litigation lawsuit to oppose the Department of Labor’s (DOL) application of the Davis-Bacon Act, which requires “prevailing wages” for construction workers on public buildings or public works projects funded by the federal or D.C. government, to a private construction project. This is an appeal after DOL ruled that the City Center DC project was subject to the 1931 Davis-Bacon Act. If left unchecked, the DOL’s attempt to apply the Davis-Bacon Act to the private construction industry would have had a significant and potentially negative impact on private industry, the government and the economy. The NAM’s brief argued that DOL’s application of the Davis-Bacon Act to a private construction project was contrary to the language of the Act and that it was an unprecedented attempt to expand the scope of the Davis-Bacon Act into the private construction industry. The court applied common sense reasoning to reject DOL’s expansion of federal law.

The NAM filed an amicus brief supporting employers’ rights to protect sensitive communications between employees and an employer’s counsel. This case involves an in-house investigation of tips alleging potential False Claims Act violations where, although the company provided 100,000 pages of documents during the discovery phase, the trial judge ordered that 89 documents identified as privileged be disclosed. If upheld, this precedent will penalize companies for adopting internal compliance programs and force companies to either risk a waiver of attorney-client privilege or to forego legal advice. The NAM’s brief argued that 1) a communication with counsel should be protected provided that the predominant or primary purpose of the communication is for securing legal advice; and 2) if these communications were to lose their privilege solely because they were part of a compliance investigation, “required by regulatory law’” many regulatory programs would be frustrated. In 2014, the appellate court overruled the trial court’s decision and ruled that the communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The trial court again ruled against the privilege assertions, and the NAM filed a second amicus brief in 2015 supporting mandamus to the appellate court. In a win for manufacturers, the appellate court reversed the district court for a second time.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in support of an employer’s right to manage internal company investigations of employee misconduct. This case stemmed from a previous National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision where Banner Health Systems instructed employees to maintain confidentiality during ongoing investigations of employee misconduct. This issue is important to manufacturers because their business operations would be disrupted by employees discussing the details of a sensitive internal company investigation. The NAM’s brief argued that the NLRB’s ruling would burden employers by requiring them to justify the need for investigatory confidentiality at a point where such justification would be almost impossible. Although the decision is narrowly tailored, the outcome is a win for manufacturers as the court did not opine on the NLRB’s case-by-case approach to justify employer confidentiality.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in support of FedEx’s position that delivery service contractors working for FedEx were independent contractors, not employees of FedEx. The facts of this case were “materially indistinguishable” from a prior case where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit determined that a group of delivery service contractors were not FedEx employees, but were independent contractors under the National Labor Relations Act. This case is important as worker classification may have broad ramifications affecting the use of independent contractors and partnerships between manufacturers and commercial vehicle drivers are a key asset. The NAM’s brief explained that worker classification issues directly impact all segments of the economy and more directly, the trucking industry. In a win for manufacturers, the court ruled against the plaintiffs.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit supporting Volkswagen in a collective bargaining dispute with the United Auto Workers (UAW). The UAW brought the complaint after Volkswagen opposed the creation of a micro-bargaining unit exclusively for maintenance employees; UAW argued that because maintenance employees “share a unique function” they are readily identifiable and therefore should be recognized as a bargaining unit. This litigation is important to manufacturers because micro-bargaining units disrupt highly integrated manufacturing operations. The NAM’s brief argued that the Specialty Healthcare case, which reversed 70 years of precedent and instated a new standard for determining a collective bargain unit, should not apply because that case is inconsistent with the statue and the legislative history. After the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a revised ruling in another case, the D.C. Circuit remanded this case back to the NLRB for reconsideration.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in the D.C. Circuit supporting Browning-Ferris in its appeal from an adverse decision by the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) in a dispute regarding the legal standard that should apply when determining whether two or more companies are “joint employers” under federal labor law. The Board abandoned its longstanding legal standard for joint employer determinations, replacing it with a new standard that evaluated whether an entity exercised indirect control over the means or manner of the employees’ work and terms of employment, or whether the entity had the potential to exercise such control. If upheld, the new standard would unreasonably expand the companies deemed to be an individual’s employer and impose employment obligations and liabilities on those employers. The NAM’s brief argued that the longstanding “direct control” standard should remain the standard for determining joint employment and that the Board’s loosened standard subjected companies to unmerited liability, without providing the same benefits as the old rule. The D.C. Circuit upheld the Board’s consideration of “reserved right to control” and “indirect control” in the joint-employer inquiry but remanded the case to the NLRB for it to adequately define what constitutes control.

The NAM filed an amicus brief in support of UPS in the first as-applied challenge of the ambush election rule. In 2014, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued the election rule, which elevated speed above due process and transparency. Shortly thereafter, because the Election Rule failed to balance other important policy objectives, the NAM brought a facial challenge to the rule in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, which rejected the challenge based on its belief that the rule would be applied in a fair manner. A fair, transparent and thorough election process is important for manufacturing employees to be able to have an informed choice whether they want to be represented by a union. The NAM’s brief argues that this case serves as a prime example of how the rule has been applied to deny employers due process, such as by failing to resolve a voter eligibility issue before the election and denying an appropriate hearing. The D.C. Circuit held that there was no defect in the Board’s decision to certify the Union and consequently denied UPS’s petition for review.

The NAM filed an amicus brief urging the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to reverse the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia's refusal to delay the deadline for filing the Revised EEO-1 Report “Component 2” pay data. The district court also should not have crafted its own remedy that ignored the significant deficiencies in the record. Component 2 creates an administrative burden for employers who will now be forced to bear the costs of complying with the requirements. The NAM’s brief argued that the EEOC had previously recognized that changes to EEO-1 require significant time and expense, the record showed questionable public benefits and the data should not be required until EEOC can preserve confidentiality.