In this case, the Supreme Court held 3/4/98 that a citizen lacked standing to bring a private enforcement action under the citizen-suit provision of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 ("EPCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 11001 et seq. In its decision, the Court reaffirmed that questions regarding the existence of a cause of action are not "jurisdictional" and may not be decided prior to resolving the question of whether a plaintiff has standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. The Court specifically declined to endorse the "hypothetical jurisdiction" doctrine adopted by several courts of appeals, which found that it was proper to adjudicate the merits of a claim despite jurisdictional objections when the merits question is more readily resolved and the prevailing party on the merits question would be the same as the prevailing party if jurisdiction was denied.In this case, citizens brought a private enforcement action for declaratory and injunctive relief under EPCRA, alleging that a manufacturer failed to file timely toxic- and hazardous-chemical storage and emissions reports. The manufacturer moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim because the manufacturer cured the violations before the lawsuit was filed, and it could not grant the requested relief because the statute did not authorize private suits for historical violations. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that EPRCA allowed citizen enforcement actions for past violations.
The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it. The Court held that the merits question — whether a cause of action exists under EPCRA to permit a citizen to sue for purely past violations — and the question of whether the plaintiff has standing to sue under Article III were separate questions, and the latter must be resolved first. The question of whether EPCRA may be construed to permit the plaintiff’s cause of action is not a jurisdictional issue and cannot be decided before determining whether the plaintiff meets the Article III standing requirements, because a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction would not be defeated by the absence of a valid cause of action under the statute (whereas a court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a lawsuit if the standing requirements are not satisfied). The "doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction" adopted by several lower courts goes beyond the constitutional bounds of authorized judicial action, for it would allow a federal court to determine the construction or constitutionality of a statute without first determining whether the court has jurisdiction to even consider the question.
Here, the plaintiff lacked standing to sue because it failed to meet the third requirement for a justiciable "case" or "controversy" under Article III — the likelihood that the requested relief would redress the alleged injury. While the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the manufacturer violated EPCRA, injunctive relief authorizing the plaintiff to make periodic inspections of the manufacturer’s facility and records, and orders requiring the manufacturer to pay civil penalties under EPCRA and to reimburse the plaintiff for its litigation expenses, none of this requested relief could reimburse the plaintiff for any losses caused by the manufacturer’s late reporting or otherwise eliminate any effects of the late reporting on the plaintiff.
The NAM filed an amicus brief supporting the ultimate result in this case.