The Supreme Court held 12/13/04 that a private party who has not been sued under Section 106 or 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 or 9607, may not obtain contribution under CERCLA Section 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), to recover amounts spent voluntarily remediating contaminated properties. The Court reasoned that Section 113(f)(1) limits a private party to seeking contribution “during or following any civil action” and that reading this provision to allow for contribution in the absence of a civil action to determine liability would render this limitation superfluous. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented on the ground that Section 107, which provides that persons responsible for cleanup costs under CERCLA “shall be liable for . . . necessary costs of response incurred by any other person,” should be read to create an implied right of action for contribution which is not limited by Section 113(f)(1) .This case is important for any business that owns properties containing hazardous substances, or that has sold properties in the past to companies that might voluntarily undertake remediation.
Decision below: 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).