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The Supreme Court 6/22/06 decided that the anti-retaliation provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not limited to protecting employees from retaliatory action taken by employers that relates to employment or occurs in the workplace. Rather, the provision covers any material action taken by the employer that would likely discourage a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of employment discrimination. The Court determined that a plain reading of Title VII indicated that Congress intended to provide employees broad protection from employer retaliation. Specifically, the Court pointed out that unlike the language of the substantive anti-discrimination provision, which limits its scope to actions that affect employment or alter the conditions of the workplace, the wording of the anti-retaliation provision contains no such qualifiers. Congress’s unqualified prohibition against retaliation was a recognition, the Court stated, that employers can effectively retaliate against employees outside of the workplace and in ways that do not relate directly to employment. But the Court was also careful to emphasize that the anti-retaliation provision does not cover petty slights or minor annoyances experienced by an employee who reports discriminatory behavior, but only materially adverse actions. Furthermore, the Court held that a finding of materiality must be based on the perspective of a reasonable worker, rather than on a particular employee’s subjective feelings. This case is of importance to every business covered by Title VII.

Decision Below: 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc)