Respondent Buckley was exposed during a three-year period to insulation dust containing asbestos while employed as a pipefitter by the railroad. In 1987, Buckley attended an "asbestos awareness" class, at which he learned of the health risks posed by contact with asbestos, which included cancer. Since then, Buckley claims he has feared that he will develop cancer, even though he has received a clean bill of health on his periodic medical check-ups for cancer and asbestosis since 1989. Buckley sued Metro-North under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") which permits a railroad worker to recover for an "injury . . . resulting . . . from" his employer's "negligence." He sought damages for emotional distress and to cover the cost of future medical check-ups. Metro-North conceded negligence, but argued (1) that there was insufficient evidence for the claim of emotional distress, and (2) that Buckley should not be able to recover costs of medical check-ups without evidence of physical harm.The district court dismissed the action, finding no sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that Buckley had suffered a real emotional injury. It did not address the issue of costs for medical monitoring. The Second Circuit reversed. Relying on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994), the court of appeals held that Buckley had suffered a "physical impact" (contact with the insulation dust), and that such contact permitted a FELA plaintiff to recover for accompanying emotional distress. Further, it held that Buckley could recover for the costs of medical monitoring.
In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court held that, under the FELA, a railworker may not recover such damages unless, and until, he manifests symptoms of a disease. The Court unanimously held that Gottshall's "physical impact" does not include physical contact with a substance that might cause a disease at a substantially later time. While Gottshall adopted a "zone of danger" test, which allows for recovery of emotional injury by plaintiffs who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by negligent conduct, the Court noted that Buckley's risk of injury was not immediate but potential and distant.
On the medical monitoring issue, the Court, with Justices Ginsburg and Stevens in dissent, held that FELA does not permit a plaintiff without symptoms or disease to recover the costs of medical monitoring.
The NAM filed an amicus brief asking the Court to limit the application of the zone of danger rule. Although this case involves an interpretation of FELA, its impact will be felt throughout the country as states interpret their own liability laws.