During his successful campaign for a spot on the West Virginia Supreme Court, Justice Benjamin received $3 million in campaign contributions from the CEO of Massey Coal Co. This represented more than 60% of the total contributions Justice Benjamin received.
A few years later, Massey Coal Co. petitioned the West Virginia Supreme Court to review a jury award of $50 million to a mining company that claimed it was forced into bankruptcy because of allegedly fraudulent conduct by Massey in securing coal-supply contracts at a steel plant. The owner of the mining company, Hugh Caperton, requested that Justice Benjamin recuse himself from the case. Justice Benjamin declined, arguing that Caperton had failed to present any evidence that Benjamin had a pecuniary interest in the matter or had exhibited an actual bias against Caperton’s company. The West Virginia Supreme Court ultimately decided to overturn the jury verdict, 3 to 2, with Justice Benjamin in the majority.
Caperton appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse himself violated Caperton’s Due Process rights, because the Massey CEO’s support for Benjamin during his campaign created an appearance of bias.
On June 8, 2009, the Court ruled 5 to 4 that the Due Process Clause requires a judge to recuse himself when an officer of a company involved in litigation before the court was the principal contributor to the judge’s campaign. It is not necessary to show that a judge has an actual bias, and the Court did not question Justice Benjamin’s subjective findings of impartiality and propriety. Rather, if a judge’s interest in a case poses “a risk of actual bias or prejudgment” using a “realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness.” Because one party had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent, Due Process requires that the judge recuse himself. The closeness in time between the election and the case was also a critical factor. The Court also thought that most recusal disputes would be resolved under state codes of judicial conduct, and would rarely need to be decided under constitutional Due Process safeguards.